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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago1, a narrow 5-4 plurality held that 
the “Second Amendment right recognized in District of Columbia v. 
Heller”2 is incorporated to the States as applied to United States 
citizens.3  The plurality was extremely divided with Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy joining only portions of 
Justice Alito’s opinion.  Meanwhile, Justices Thomas and Scalia each 
wrote their own concurrence.  In the end, what stands out is that the five 
Justices comprising the McDonald plurality were the same five Justices 
that decided the majority opinion in Heller.4  Unlike the unified Heller 
majority, the McDonald plurality was divided as to how the Second 
Amendment should be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.  
While Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito 
incorporated Heller right through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause,5 Justice Thomas incorporated it through the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.6
This division is significant in many respects.  Perhaps what is most 
important is that the voting paradox effectively limited incorporation to 
the right recognized in Heller—the right of armed, individual self-
defense of the home with a handgun—to citizens,
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 1. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 for Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence states: 
 2. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 3. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. 
 4. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (the majority consisted of Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito). 
 5. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3041-48. 
 6. Id. at 3058-88 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 7. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“But we think the basic premise 
for this line of reasoning is faulty.  When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
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I conclude that the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States 
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which recognizes the 
rights of United States “citizens.”  The plurality concludes that the 
right applies to the States through the Due Process Clause, which 
covers all “person[s].”  Because this case does not involve a claim 
brought by a noncitizen, I express no view on the difference, if any, 
between my conclusion and the plurality’s with respect to the extent to 
which the States may regulate firearm possession by noncitizens.8
Whether aliens, lawfully present, undocumented or both, have a 
constitutional right to arms is just one of the many legal issues left 
unanswered by the McDonald opinion.
 
9  Another unsettled issue 
involves any clarification as to a standard of review for Heller’s 
longstanding regulatory prohibitions.10  The opinions of Justices Alito 
and Thomas merely recite Heller’s constitutional presumption as to 
traditional regulatory “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill,” and “laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, 
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sales 
of arms.”11  Any hope that a more expansive Second Amendment would 
be identified was dashed when every plurality opinion merely 
incorporated the limited right recognized in Heller—nothing more.12
 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds’ . . 
. ." (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). 
  
Not even Heller’s brief mention of the importance of bearing arms to 
 8. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3083 n.19. 
 9. Prior to McDonald, courts have consistently held that the right recognized in Heller does 
not extend to undocumented aliens because they do not qualify as “persons,” see United States v. 
Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8166, at *5-13 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 
2010); United States v. Boffil-Rivera, No. 08-20437-CR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84633, at *11-22 
(S.D. Fl. Aug. 12, 2008); United States v. Guerrero-Leco, No. 3:08cr118, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103448, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2008) (noting Heller “did not find that all individuals present in 
America are protected by the Second Amendment . . . [and] described that protection as belonging 
to American citizens.”). 
 10. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.  From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and 
courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in 
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose . . . Although we do not undertake an exhaustive 
historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment nothing in our opinion should 
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.”). 
 11. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17). 
 12. Id. at 3020. 
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hunt13 was restated as dicta14
In sum, the McDonald decision did little to change the legal 
landscape of “gun rights” as we know them other than preventing state 
and municipal governments from having outright bans on handgun 
possession in the home.  This begets the question, “What, if any, other 
Second Amendment protections will be extended, and what is the 
constitutional standard of review by which future courts may extend 
them?”  Surprisingly, the answer to this question rests with the courts 
using “historical guideposts.”  While the plurality shunned historical 
academia in examining the constitutional scope of the right to “keep and 
bear arms,”
 and the prefatory language “well-regulated 
militia” did not appear once in the five Justice plurality. 
15 it ironically affirmed that much of this same history will 
aid courts in carving out future Second Amendment protections.16
The Court’s deviation from historical academia is not a novel 
concept.  Throughout our jurisprudence, justices have wrestled with 
 
 
 13. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801 (“The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the 
militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even 
more important for self-defense and hunting.”). 
 14. Neither Alito, Scalia, or Thomas’ opinions identified a right to hunt as applied to the 
States.  See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3021-88.   In fact, Alito’s plurality seems to intentionally 
exclude hunting, writing, “[W]e stressed that the right was also valued because the possession of 
firearms was thought to be essential for self-defense.”  Id. at 3048. 
 15. Id. at 3048 (“[W]hile there is certainly room for disagreement about Heller’s analysis of 
the history of the right to keep and bear arms, nothing written since Heller persuades us to reopen 
and question there decided.”).  The historical scholarship questioning Heller’s originalism is 
immense.  See Paul Finkelman, It Really Was About a Well-Regulated Militia, 59 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 267 (2008);  William Merkel, The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s 
Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 349 (2009); Nathan Kozuskanich, 
Originalism in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right to Bear Arms, 29 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 585 
(2009); PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY 
THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT (2009) [hereinafter THE SECOND AMENDMENT]; Patrick J. 
Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia” Asserted and Proven With 
Commentary on the Future of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 3 NORTHEASTERN L. REV. 1 
[hereinafter The Constitutional Significance of A “Well-Regulated Militia”]; Patrick J. Charles, The 
Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance: A True Legal and Historical Understanding of the 
Anglo-American Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO. 18, 22-24 (2010) [hereinafter The 
Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance]; Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An 
Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second 
Amendment Should Be Incorporated in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351 
(2009) [hereinafter “Arms for Their Defence”?]; Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law 
Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2009); Saul 
Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes, the Second Amendment and Originalist Methodology, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 1541 (2009); David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a 
Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in 
Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009). 
 16.  The plurality opinion begins with a thorough recitation of Second Amendment history in 
order to frame the direction of the following arguments. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036-44. 
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history; coming to conclusions that do not comport with the historical 
consensus.17  Perhaps the primary reason for the differences of 
interpretation rests with the conflicting duties of a historian compared to 
that of an advocate or jurist.18  Historians sort through thousands of 
pieces of historical evidence to recreate an event according to “beliefs, 
attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our 
day,” removing themselves from modern biases, which often leaves us 
with more questions than answers.19  Advocates use historical evidence 
differently.  They compile data and facts as a means to place their client 
in the best position to succeed in the cause or litigation.20  Also, this 
evidence is narrowly focused and but a sampling of the whole.  While 
advocates may properly quote sources and provide historical facts, they 
ignore or recast others and fail to remove their modern biases.  Most 
importantly, advocates often lack the historical expertise to provide 
context—a crucial aspect of the historical profession in determining the 
truth and credibility of the work.21  However, given that the goal of an 
advocate is to succeed in the litigation, they are almost compelled to cast 
history in a light that supports their stance, not what accepted historical 
methodologies command.22  It is a rare occurrence that advocates and 
jurists are applauded by professional historians.23
In many ways it is as if history and advocacy cannot co-exist.  This 
is because the law requires providing definitive answers to questions that 
historians cannot confirm with accuracy, and advocates almost have a 
duty to make conclusions that are not supported by social, philosophical, 
and political norms of the historical era at issue.  At the same time, 
history and advocacy must co-exist.  This is due to the fact that the use 
 
 
 17. See, e.g. Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A 
Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago 
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 418-21 (2002). Judicial conclusions may deviate from 
historical consensus for a variety of reasons, not limited to page limitations and the selective nature 
of choosing history that supports the desired result. 
 18. Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and 
Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 382-88 (1998). 
 19. Id. at 378. 
 20. Id. at 382 (“One can hardly expect detached, unbiased history to appear within the context 
of such an argument, for though advocates may pay lip service to the truth, their main objective is 
victory.”).  See also id. at 451 (“The honest historian, then, must recognize her biases and try to 
subdue them, even as she realizes that to some degree she will probably fail.  The effort, however, is 
one of the things that makes the history credible.”). 
 21. Id. at 389-96. 
 22. Id. at 382. 
 23. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1945). 
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of legal precedent is history in itself.24  Furthermore, it is almost a 
necessity that advocates and jurists use some form of historical 
methodology to determine the legislative intent of statutes, laws, and 
ordinances.  Lastly, and most importantly, history and advocacy must 
co-exist, for when answering new constitutional questions it is 
imperative that some aspect of “original intent” be examined through 
historical sources.25
Although history and advocacy must co-exist, this does not mean 
that history and legal opinions addressing historical events will be or 
have to be mirror images of one another.
 
26  The differing methodologies 
of law and history often command that the two disciplines operate in 
parallel universes.  While each universe may have similarities as to the 
“who, what, when, and where,” it is the “why” that divides history from 
the law.  The Heller opinion offers the perfect example of how the 
historical and legal professions diverge in this regard.  Indeed, there are 
scholarly works that support the Heller majority’s conclusion and 
provide the adequate “who, what, when, and where.”27
 
 24. Melton, supra note 18, at 416. 
  However, these 
 25. For some approaches to fulfilling “original intent,” see JACK N. RAKOVE, INTERPRETING 
THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The 
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 261 (2000) (discussing “original intent” in the constraints of the history of slavery); 
Michael Kent Curtis, Teaching Free Speech From an Incomplete Fossil Record, 34 AKRON L. REV. 
231, 257-58 (2000) (discussing the problems of “original intent” when courts do not take history in 
context). 
 26. Melton, supra note 18, at 383-88. 
 27. For the two most prominent, see STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND 
AMENDMENT (2008); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994).  One great example, of many, concerning this divergence rests 
with the 1775 THE DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY FOR TAKING UP ARMS.  One of 
the grievances states: 
The inhabitants of Boston being confined within that town by the General, their 
Governor, and having, in order to procure their dismission, entered into a treaty with 
him, it was stipulated that the said inhabitants, having deposited their arms with their 
own magistrates, should have liberty to depart, taking with them their other effects.  
They accordingly delivered up their arms, but in open violation of honor, in defiance of 
the obligation of treaties, which even savage nations esteemed sacred, the Governor 
ordered the arms deposited as aforesaid, that they might be preserved for their owners, to 
be seized by a body of soldiers; detained the greatest part of the inhabitants in the town, 
and compelled the few who were permitted to retire to leave their most valuable effects 
behind. 
THE DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY FOR TAKING UP ARMS (July 6, 1775), reprinted 
in SOURCE OF OUR LIBERTIES 295, 298 (Richard L. Perry ed., rev. ed. 1972) (Congress 1775).  
Individual Right Scholars stress that this grievance proves that the colonists were disarmed in 
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works lack the adequate “why” by jumping to predetermined 
conclusions, maintaining modern ideological biases, and taking 
historical events out of context; analyses that are not accepted by 
historical academia because they conflict with the conducting of 
historical methodologies.28
The fact that historical academia and the Supreme Court have 
diverged on the Second Amendment does not mean the courts should 
discard history altogether when examining the “right to keep and bear 
arms” in future cases and controversies.  It needs to be a point of 
emphasis that—out of the three branches of government—only the 
judiciary has a duty to preserve our past
 
29 through precedents, legislative 
intent, and the Constitution with what is referred to as “original intent.”  
To put it another way, jurists have a duty to maintain a “historical 
consciousness.”30
In order to know what [the law] is, we must know what it has been, 
and what it tends to become.  We must alternately consult history and 
existing theories of legislation.  But the most difficult labor will be to 
understand the combination of the two into new products at every 
stage.
  In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, this means: 
31
This maintaining of a “historical consciousness” requires jurists to 
be forthright and honest in their opinions with their use of “historical 
guideposts.”  It is the rare occasion that historical events will specifically 
correlate with a case or controversy before the court.  The best that 
jurists can hope for is to use “historical guideposts” to explain legal 
outcomes based on some form of an accepted historical methodology.
 
32
 
violation of their right to “have arms.”  What is apparent upon looking at the grievance is that there 
is no mention of a right or privilege to “have arms.”  This is odd seeing that the Declaration 
describes the deprivation of trial by jury grievance as denying an “accustomed and inestimable 
privilege”—a grievance that was described in the 1774 Declaration of Rights and Grievances as a 
“constitutional” right.  See Charles, “Arms For Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 444.  More 
importantly, the grievance against Gage was not with the seizure of arms, but that he violated the 
“treaty” with Boston’s inhabitants—a fact that is evidenced by the Declaration’s language “in 
defiance of the obligation of treaties” and the contemporaneous literature of the period.  Id. at 443-
48. 
 
 28. See supra note 15. 
 29. Erin Rahne Kidwell, The Paths of the Law: Historical Consciousness, Creative 
Democracy, and Judicial Review, 62 ALB. L. REV. 91, 109-10, 146 (1998). 
 30. Id. at 146; Melton, supra note 18, at 384 (“If judges are going to write history, they should 
strive to do a competent job of it.”). 
 31. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1963) (1881). 
 32. Melton, supra note 18, at 385 (“[D]isparity in the state of research tools and sources . . . is 
a principal reason why accomplished attorneys, judges, and law professors often turn out to be poor 
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Perhaps the most effective historical methodology for jurists to use 
is the combination of Social History and New Intellectual History.  
Naturally, before combining the two, each methodology must be defined 
according to its own terms.  First, Social History focuses on “social 
groups rather than on individuals, on the masses rather than the elites, 
and on ordinary folk rather than prominent people.”33  It examines what 
the Supreme Court has dubbed “public understanding” or “popular 
understanding”; a showing of social acceptance of an issue, case, or 
controversy dependent on the era in question.  Meanwhile, New 
Intellectual History stresses political philosophy, “taking the ideas of the 
founding fathers seriously and [accepting] their rhetoric as reflecting 
more their view of reality.”34
This leaves us with the question: “What is a ‘historical guidepost’ 
within the constraints of this Social History and New Intellectual History 
methodological approach?”  A “historical guidepost” is a historical 
event, philosophy, or political ideology that was prominent or influential 
in impacting the law, statute, or constitutional provision at issue.  For the 
purposes of analyzing the Second Amendment, a “historical guidepost” 
is either a longstanding historical restriction on the “keeping” or 
“bearing” of arms circa 1791 or a longstanding philosophical or political 
ideology for regulating or restricting the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms 
as understood circa 1791. 
  In the constraints of judicial review, New 
Intellectual History takes into account political and philosophical 
restraints on the issue, case, or controversy dependent on the area in 
question.  Thus, if we combine Social History and New Intellectual 
History, it requires the courts to give consideration to both the ideologies 
of the founding fathers and how the public understood those ideologies 
in practice. 
This article sets forth how the courts should address such 
“historical guideposts” by prescribing a standard of review.  First, the 
purpose of a “historical guidepost” standard of review is to work within 
the conflicting pursuits of the history and legal professions.  As 
discussed above, it is almost impossible for historians, advocates, and 
jurists to come to the same historical conclusions.35
 
amateur historians.  Another reason is the law’s emphasis on an analytical approach to the subject is 
in many ways not just different from, but the antithesis of, a historical approach.”). 
  The purpose of a 
historian is to seek the truth by balancing the historical evidence and 
 33. 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 19 (Gerald N. Grob & George A. Billias eds., 
6th ed. 1992). 
 34. Id. at 168. 
 35. Melton, supra note 18, at 382. 
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attempting to disprove the historian’s thesis, which ultimately leads to 
many questions being unanswered.  Meanwhile, advocates and jurists 
seek to provide definitive answers despite the lack of empirical 
evidence.36
Second, the “historical guidepost” standard of review works within 
the constraints of judicial precedent.  Although judicial precedent may 
not comport with the historical consensus, advocates and jurists are 
almost required to work within the history provided from the higher 
court.
 
37  It is only at the Supreme Court that controversial history can be 
reexamined to comport with the historical consensus.38
Third, and most importantly, the “historical guidepost” standard of 
review requires jurists to maintain a “historical consciousness.”  This 
requires jurists to accept our “[changing] societies, cultures, and 
communities”
 
39 when examining “historical guideposts.”  It will be a 
rare occasion that a modern Second Amendment issue, case, or 
controversy will exactly replicate eighteenth century facts or restrictions 
on the “right to keep and bear arms” circa 1791.  However, this should 
not disparage that there existed longstanding political and philosophical 
restrictions on arms circa 1791.  It is these political and philosophical 
restrictions that provide historic insight as to the constitutionality of 
current “arms” regulations.  What the “historical guidepost” approach 
does is it takes into account these philosophies through the combination 
of Social History and New Intellectual History methodologies.40
To be clear, the “historical guidepost” approach seeks to work 
within the constraints of judicial precedent and stare decisis.  It requires 
a responsible use of history by advocates and jurists within these 
constraints.  Its purpose is not to overturn Heller’s acknowledgment of 
an English common law right to armed self-defense in the home, for 
only the Supreme Court has the authority to rewrite this version of 
Second Amendment history,
 
41
 
 36. Id. 
 even though it does not comport with the 
 37. Id. at 383. 
 38. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 788 (1995); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. 
for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458–59 (1983); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665-666 n.9-10 
(1944); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (J. Scalia, J., dissenting); Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 574-75 (1985) (J. Souter, J., concurring in 
part). 
 39. CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF 
PRAGMATISM 70 (1989). 
 40. See supra note 33. 
 41. See supra note 38. 
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historical consensus.42
In addition to establishing the framework of this judicial standard, 
the second part of this study sets forth to address two key arguments that 
were missing from the City of Chicago’s briefs.  This includes: (1) 
differentiating the importance of the right to “keep arms,” the right to 
“bear arms,” and a “well-regulated militia” through State Second 
Amendment analogues circa 1789, 1803, and 1868, and (2) providing 
the Court with historical evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
chief architect, John Bingham, and the whole Reconstruction Congress 
may have only intended to incorporate the Second Amendment as to 
protect the right of citizens to take part in defending their liberties in a 
“well-regulated militia.” 
  In other words, the “historical guidepost” 
standard of review requires the inclusion of history through advocacy to 
solve legal issues, cases and controversies.  It does not serve or pretend 
to serve as providing historical answers.  It merely seeks to use history 
responsibly and as an effective tool to analyze the “right to keep and 
bear arms.” 
It is within the second part of this study where the methodology of 
the “historical guidepost” standard of review partially divorces itself 
from the rest of the study.  The analyses of the right to “keep arms,” the 
right to “bear arms,” and a “well-regulated militia” through State Second 
Amendment analogues are effective tools under the “historical 
guidepost” approach.  However, the primary approach of this article is to 
provide a key legal history argument that the City of Chicago did not 
fully address in its brief or at oral arguments. 
Meanwhile, the analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment ratifiers’ 
“popular understanding” of how the Second Amendment bound the 
States through the Privileges or Immunities Clause works solely within 
accepted historical methodologies.  It seeks to expound the argument 
that the historical record is incomplete as to whether the consensus 
among the ratifiers was that the Second Amendment protected armed, 
individual self-defense of the home.  The answer as to what constitutes 
“popular understanding” circa 1868 is not as clear and convincing as the 
Heller majority and McDonald plurality would have it.  The fact that 
some members of Congress may have viewed the Second Amendment as 
securing a right against private violence does not dictate how Congress 
or “popular understanding” as a whole may have understood it.  The 
Amendment’s mention of a “well-regulated militia” and a “free State” 
was often construed as protecting purely a militia right.  Until a more 
 
 42. See supra note 15. 
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exhaustive historical study is conducted, professional historians cannot 
state with certainty what the drafters’ intent as a whole constituted. 
II.  LESSONS IN HISTORY: MCDONALD, HELLER, AND ESTABLISHING THE 
HISTORICAL GUIDEPOST STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GUN CONTROL REGULATIONS 
In light of Heller, the use of some form of “historical guideposts” to 
determine the constitutionality of gun control restrictions has been 
common practice in recent court decisions.43
[W]e read Heller as establishing the following general approach to 
Second Amendment cases. First, some gun laws will be valid because 
they regulate conduct that falls outside the terms of the right as 
publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was ratified. If the 
government can establish this, then the analysis need go no further. If, 
however, a law regulates conduct falling within the scope of the right, 
then the law will be valid (or not) depending on the government's 
ability to satisfy whatever level of means-end scrutiny is held to apply; 
the degree of fit required between the means and the end will depend 
on how closely the law comes to the core of the right and the severity 
of the law's burden on the right.
  These courts have 
rationalized that since the Heller majority used “original meaning” to 
determine the right to “keep and bear arms,” the logical starting point, as 
to whether a restriction is constitutional, is to examine it in the historical 
constraints as understood at the founding.  The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals seems to be the first to establish a form of the “historical 
guidepost” standard of review in the first ruling of United States v. 
Skoien: 
44
 
 43. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008).  For courts following 
this standard, see United States v. Rene, 583 F.3d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2009) ([The court first looked] 
to nineteenth century state laws imposing similar restrictions, as the Heller Court did.); United 
States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g en banc, No. 08-3770, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 6584 (7th Cir. Feb 22, 2010), and on reh’g en banc No. 08-3770, 2010 WL 
2735747 (7th Cir. July 13, 2010); United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3739, at *16-19 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (following the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Skoien); United States v. Tooley, No. 3:09-00194, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58591, at *17 
(S.D. WV June 14, 2010) (“To determine the appropriate level of review, this Court will engage in a 
historical analysis of the Second Amendment as it would apply to 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(9).”); United 
States v. Walker, No. 3:10CR358-HEH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39473, at *11-12 (E.D. Va. Apr. 
21, 2010); United States v. Brown, No. 3:09cr339, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51515, at *21-29 (E.D. 
Va. May 25, 2010) (discussing the history of the arms restrictions at the Founding). 
 
 44. Skoien, 587 F.3d at 808-09 (emphasis in original). 
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To paraphrase, the Seventh Circuit believed that judicial deference 
should be given to historical Anglo-American restraints on “arms.”  It is 
only when the government cannot provide an accepted Anglo-American 
restraint, as understood by the founding fathers, that the court will 
undertake further review.  In United States v. Chester, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals followed this standard of review, determining that 
because the plaintiff was not a “law-abiding, responsible citizen” that he 
was “at least one step ‘removed from the core constitutional right’” 
recognized in Heller.45
However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the 
“historical guidepost” approach in its Skoien en banc decision.
  Naturally, using “historical guideposts” to 
determine the constitutionality of gun control laws can be viewed as 
questionable given that the Skoien decision was vacated and Chester was 
unpublished. 
46  Not to 
mention, other circuits agree with the use of “historical guideposts” 
because they have adopted similar approaches.  In United States v. Rene, 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed it was important to look at 
nineteenth century state laws as the Heller Court did, and rested its 
“conclusion on the existence of longstanding tradition of prohibiting 
juveniles from both receiving and possessing handguns[.]”47  Recently, 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with a “historical guidepost” 
approach when it held, “If the Second Amendment codified a pre-
existing right to bear arms, it codified the pre-ratification understanding 
of that right.”48
Numerous district courts are similarly adopting “historical 
guideposts” as a standard of review.  For instance, in United States v. 
Walker and United States v. Brown, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District Court of Virginia has adopted the use of “historical 
 
 
 45. Chester, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3739, at *18. 
 46. United States v. Skoien, No. 08-3770, 2010 U. S. App. LEXIS 14262, at *6 (7th Cir. July 
13, 2010) (“[F]or current purposes . . . the legislative role did not end in 1791.  That some 
categorical limits are proper is part of the original meaning, leaving to the people’s elected 
representatives the filling in the details.”); id. at 35 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“[M]y colleagues elide 
the historical-scope question; they do not decide whether persons convicted of a domestic violence 
misdemeanor are completely “outside the reach” of the Second Amendment as a matter of 
founding-era history.”).  See also United States v. Williams, No. 09-3174, 2010 WL 3035483, at *5 
(7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2010) (also upholding the “two step approach” with the first step examining 
“whether the challenged conduct falls within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection . . . 
at the founding”). 
 47. Rene, 583 F.3d at 12. 
 48. United States v. Marzzarella, No. 09-3185, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15655, at *13 (3rd Cir. 
July 29, 2010). 
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guideposts” as “compelling.”49  Meanwhile in United States v. Tooley, 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of West 
Virginia found the use of “historical understanding” as being “based 
upon the plain language in Heller, and is consistent with the approach 
taken by courts in analyzing protections for freedom of speech under the 
First Amendment.”50
Unfortunately, the use of “historical guideposts” has been applied 
differently and inconsistently.  For instance, the First Circuit gave 
substantial deference to the fact that juvenile restrictions had 
traditionally existed in the nineteenth century when coming to its 
determination.
 
51  In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s vacated decision in 
Skoien took more of a historical parallel approach by comparing 
domestic violence misdemeanants to Founding-Era restrictions, 
concluding that there was no exact historical comparison.52  The Walker 
court similarly took this narrow approach by determining “it would have 
made little sense for the Founders” to place gun control restrictions 
based on the nature of the offense and “length of incarceration as is done 
today.”53  Meanwhile, the Tooley court used “historical guideposts” to 
determine whether the restriction was “outside the ‘core’ of the right—in 
which case lesser review than strict scrutiny would most likely be 
appropriate.”54
Given the unpredictable nature of the use of “historical guideposts,” 
one may argue that a different standard should be used to examine future 
Second Amendment challenges.
  In other words, the Tooley court used historical parallels 
as the means to quantify a constitutional standard of scrutiny. 
55
 
 49. Walker, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39473, at *10; see also Brown, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
51515, at *21-29. 
  Based on the plurality opinion in 
 50. United States v. Tooley, No. 3:09-00194, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58591, at *18 (S.D. WV 
June 14, 2010). 
 51. Rene, 583 F.3d at 11-13. 
 52. The court failed to find a perfect fit and went to the second part of its test.  See United 
States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 810-11 (7th Cir. 2009).  The Skoien en banc decision skipped the 
Founding-Era historical review, stating “the legislative role did not end in 1791.”  Skoien, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 14262, at *6. 
 53. Walker, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39473, at *13. 
 54. Tooley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58591, at *18.  See also id. at *18 n.4 (“The historical 
treatment of the regulated conduct guides the determination of the extent to which a core right, or 
something less, is implicated.”). 
 55. For other commentary on standards of review after Heller, see Adam Winkler, Heller’s 
Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1443 (2009); Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of 
Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1 
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McDonald v. City of Chicago, however, the Supreme Court disagrees.  
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy acquiesced to the continuance of Heller’s 
“historical guidepost” framework.  They all agreed that the “Fourteenth 
Amendment has not been historically understood to restrict the authority 
of the States to regulate firearms” within constitutional restraints.56  The 
opinion went on to affirm that the Second Amendment is not historically 
a right “to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose.”57
Furthermore, similar to his majority opinion in Heller, Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion unequivocally supports using “historical 
guideposts” to determine the constitutionality of gun control laws.  
Writing in response to Justice Stevens’ dissent, Scalia confirms that the 
“traditional restrictions [on arms] go to show the scope of the right” just 
as history helps to define “other rights.”
 
58  Scalia concedes that 
conducting “historical analysis can be difficult,” and will sometimes 
require courts to resolve “threshold questions, and mak[e] nuanced 
judgments about which evidence to consult and how to interpret it.”59  
However, he believes the historical method need not be the “perfect 
means . . . but whether it is the best means available in an imperfect 
world.”60
In the most controversial matters brought before this Court . . . any 
historical methodology, under any plausible standard of proof, would 
lead to the same conclusion.  Moreover, the methodological 
differences that divide historians, and the varying interpretative 
assumptions they bring to their work, are nothing compared to the 
differences among the American people[.]
  In particular, Scalia prefers “historical guideposts” because: 
61
Thus, according to the McDonald plurality, it is a requisite that 
courts use “historical guideposts”—longstanding historical restrictions 
on the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms circa 1791 or a longstanding 
political or philosophical ideology for regulating or restricting the 
 
 
(2009); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 
COLUM L. REV. 1278 (2009). 
 56. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 57. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008).  The 
plurality and Justice Thomas also confirmed that the longstanding restrictions were constitutionally 
permissible.  Id. at 3059-88. 
 58. Id. at 3056 (emphasis in original). 
 59. Id. at 3057. 
 60. Id. at 3057-58 (emphasis in original). 
 61. Id. at 3058 (emphasis in original). 
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“keeping” or “bearing” of arms circa 1791—when analyzing the 
constitutional scope of the Second Amendment.  This still leaves one 
very important question: “What should a responsible and effective 
historical guidepost standard look like?” 
A. The “Historical Guidepost” Standard of Review 
As was seen by the conflicting views in the First, Third, Fourth, 
and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the subsequent federal district 
courts, “historical guideposts” have been applied inconsistently.62  
Despite this fact, all the courts seem to be in concurrence with one 
important fact; there is a two-part test in determining the 
constitutionality of gun control laws.63  The test stipulates that if history 
cannot answer whether a restriction is constitutionally permissive, 
differing degrees of scrutiny should apply dependent upon how close the 
restriction is to the “core” of the Heller right.64  Regarding the second 
part of this test, the Seventh Circuit in Skoien held, “the degree of fit 
required between the means and the end will depend on how closely the 
law comes to the core of the right and the severity of the law's burden on 
the right.”65  In making this determination the court can use “historical 
guideposts” to mitigate or enhance the level of scrutiny.66
While this study will not seek to provide an exhaustive study as to 
the differing levels of scrutiny in the second part of the “historical 
guidepost” standard of review, it will acknowledge a few caveats.  First, 
it is well-established that Justice Breyer’s interest balancing approach 
has been denounced by both the Heller majority and McDonald 
plurality.
 
67  Second, given that the McDonald plurality only recognized, 
incorporated, and ranked as “fundamental” the limited right expounded 
in Heller,68
 
 62. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
 the Supreme Court seems to have only acquiesced to “strict 
scrutiny” applying towards regulations that expressly diminish the 
 63. See supra note 43; United States v. Marzzarella, No. 09-3185, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15655, at *12-13 (3rd Cir. July 29, 2010). 
 64. United States v. Tooley, No. 3:09-00194, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58591, at *18 (S.D. WV 
June 14, 2010 
 65. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g en banc, No. 
08-3770, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6584, *4-5 (7th Cir. Feb 22, 2010), and on reh’g en banc No. 08-
3770, 2010 WL 2735747 (7th Cir. July 13, 2010). 
 66. For the most detailed application of this standard, see Tooley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
58591, at *18-35. 
 67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008); McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
 68. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036-48. 
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limited right recognized in Heller.  In other words, “strict scrutiny” may 
only apply to restrictions that aim to prevent a “law-abiding” citizen 
from exercising the right of armed self-defense in the home with a 
handgun. 
What this study will seek to provide is a workable and responsible 
analysis for the courts in answering the first part of the “historical 
guidepost” standard of review, for without it, judges will be forced to 
weigh history that they may not be familiar with.69  It is this lack of 
professional historical training that may lead courts to “point in any 
direction the judges favor.”70  As Justice Stevens noted in his McDonald 
dissent, “It is not the role of federal judges to be amateur historians.”71  
His comment was not meant to “criticize judges’ use of history in 
general or to suggest that it always generates indeterminable 
answers[.]”72  Instead, Stevens’ point was that the McDonald plurality 
provided no guidance as to which historical “pieces to credit and which 
to discount, and then . . . assemble them into a coherent whole.”73
The “historical guidepost” standard of review assuages such 
concerns.  It seeks to work within the constraints of judicial precedent 
and stare decisis.  It requires the responsible use of history by advocates 
and jurists to solve legal issues, cases, and controversies.  It does not 
serve or pretend to serve as providing definitive historical answers.  It 
merely seeks to use history responsibly and as an effective tool to 
analyze the “right to keep and bear arms” through the lens of “historical 
guideposts.”  For the purposes of analyzing the Second Amendment, a 
“historical guidepost” is either a longstanding historical restriction on 
the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms or a longstanding ideology for 
regulating or restricting the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms.  This 
standard is in line with both the vacated and en banc Skoien decisions.
 
74
 
 69. One legal dilemma for judges is that historians and lawyers ask different questions.  See 
Eric Foner, The Second Founding: Remarks at the Conference on the Second Founding, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1289, 1290 (2008). 
  
It requires the courts give federal and state governments some deference 
to adopt gun restrictions that fall within traditional and historical areas of 
regulation as would have been publicly accepted by the founding 
 70. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058.  See also generally Cornell, supra note 15. 
 71. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3119. 
 72. Id. at 3118. 
 73. Id. at 3117. 
 74. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g en banc, 
No. 08-3770, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6584, *4-5 (7th Cir. Feb 22, 2010), and on reh’g en banc No. 
08-3770, 2010 WL 2735747 (7th Cir. July 13, 2010). 
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fathers.75  As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. 
Marzzarella, the threshold question is not whether there is a perfect 
historical parallel, but whether it was “commonly understood at the time 
of ratification,” for “the Second Amendment codified a pre-existing right 
to bear arms . . . [and] the pre-ratification understanding of that right.”76
Restrictions that generally fall within this framework are those 
designed to protect the public against injury,
 
77 and regulations on aliens, 
both documented and undocumented,78 hunting,79
 
 75. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3118 (Stevens’ dissent argues that the plurality’s view is that 
public understanding at the founding controls interpretation); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. 
Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to 
have when the people adopted them”).  For the argument that the best way to understand the 
founders’ “popular understanding” of the right to arms and the Second Amendment is through an 
historical examination of contemporaneous laws, see CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra 
note 15, at 17-34. 
 felons and the 
 76. United States v. Marzzarella, No. 09-3185, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15655, at *12-13 (3rd 
Cir. July 29, 2010). 
 77. In 1534, Henry VIII passed a statute banning weapons from “any Place within the 
Distance of two Miles from the same Sessions or Court, nor any Town, Church, Fair, Market or 
other Congregation, except it be upon a Hute or Outcry[.]”  26 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1534) (Eng.).  Even 
after the 1689 Declaration of Rights “have arms” provision was codified as the English Bill of 
Rights, Parliament and the crown maintained unfettered authority to disarm “dangerous and 
disaffected persons.”  Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 386-98.  The 
American colonies similarly disarmed those who would not profess their allegiance to Congress or 
local governments.  CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 82-83; Charles, The 
Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at 18.  See also AN ACT 
IN ADDITION TO THE SEVERAL ACTS ALREADY MADE TO THE PRUDENT STORAGE OF GUN POWDER 
WITHIN THE TOWN OF BOSTON (Mass. 1783); AN ACT TO IMPOWER THE CORPORATION OF THE 
BOROUGH OF NORFOLK TO ASSESS A TAX ON THE INHABITANTS THEREOF, FOR THE PURPOSES 
THEREIN MENTIONED (Va. 1772), reprinted in 8 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 611-13 (William 
Walter Hening ed., 1821); THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE 
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (Dec. 17, 1787) (“That 
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and their own state . . . unless for 
crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.”). 
 78. The entire legal premise for excluding aliens from the right to “keep and bear arms” was 
being a member of the political community.  In other words, the doctrine of allegiance, as 
prescribed by the government according to their respective spheres, controls whether aliens can 
enjoy the right with citizens.  For doctrine of allegiance in prescribing the rights of aliens within the 
constraints of the Plenary Power Doctrine, see generally Patrick J. Charles, The Plenary Power 
Doctrine and the Constitutionality of Ideological Exclusion: A Historical Perspective, 15 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL (Forthcoming Fall 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1618976.  For the importance of being a 
member of the political community to bear arms, see generally Charles, The Constitutional 
Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15.  See also THE INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER 
(Philadelphia, PA), Sept. 23, 1786, at 3, col.2 (“To instruct vagabonds, servants, or slaves, in the 
military art, and even arm them at the expence of the state, will be the worst policy.”); 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE OFFICERS OF SEVERAL REGIMENTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 
FORCES…10TH DAY OF JULY 1775 (1775) (“You are not to Enlist any Person who is not an 
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mentally ill,80 the carrying of arms in public,81 concealed weapons,82 
limiting the types of arms individuals may possess,83
 
American-born, unless such Person has a Wife and Family, and is a settled Resident in this 
Country.”). 
 the transportation 
 79. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 386-98 (discussing the Anglo 
understanding of hunting restrictions); CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 20-
21 (discussing that neither “bear arms” nor “keep arms” was ever used in hunting restrictions 
preceding, contemporaneous, or immediately following the adoption of the Constitution).  In fact, 
one Maryland law made it unlawful for an individual to use his militia arms for hunting.  A 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE ACT ENTITLED, AN ACT TO REGULATE AND DISCIPLINE THE MILITIA OF THIS 
STATE, § 30 (Md. 1799) (“[A]ny private or non commissioned officer, to whom a musket is 
delivered, shall use the same for hunting, gunning or fowling, or shall not keep his arms . . . in neat 
and clean order . . . shall” pay a fine).  For examples of other hunting restrictions, see AN ACT FOR 
THE PRESERVATION OF THE BREED OF WILD DEER (Md. 1729); AN ACT FOR MORE EFFECTUAL 
PRESERVATION OF THE BREED OF DEER (Md. 1773); AN ACT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE 
BREED OF WILD DEER, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREIN (Md., November 1789); AN ACT TO 
PREVENT KILLING OF DEER OUT OF SEASON AND AGAINST CARRYING GUNS AND HUNTING BY 
PERSONS NOT QUALIFIED (N.J. 1722); A SUPPLEMENTARY ACT TO THE ACT ENTITLED, “AN ACT TO 
PREVENT THE KILLING OF DEER OUT OF SEASON AND AGAINST CARRYING GUNS AND HUNTING BY 
PERSONS NOT QUALIFIED” (N.J. 1751); AN ACT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF DEER AND OTHER 
GAME, AND TO PREVENT TRESPASSING WITH GUNS (N.J. 1771); AN ACT TO PREVENT HUNTING 
WITH FIRE-ARMS IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK, AND THE LIBERTIES THEREOF (N.Y. 1763); AN ACT 
TO AMEND AN ACT ENTITLED, “AN ADDITIONAL ACT TO AN ACT, ENTITLED, AN ACT TO PREVENT 
KILLING DEER AT UNREASONABLE TIMES AND FOR PUTTING A STOP TO MANY ABUSES 
COMMITTED BY WHITE PERSONS UNDER THE PRETENCE OF HUNTING (N.C. 1766); AN ACT TO 
PREVENT THE KILLING OF DEER OUT OF SEASON, AND AGAINST CARRYING OF GUNS OR HUNTING 
BY PERSONS NOT QUALIFIED (Pa. 1721); AN ACT TO PREVENT THE HUNTING OF DEER . . . AND 
AGAINST KILLING DEER OUT OF SEASON (Pa. 1760); AN ACT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF DEER, 
AND TO PREVENT THE MISCHIEFS ARISING FROM HUNTING AT UNREASONABLE TIMES (S.C. 1769). 
 80. AN ACT FOR THE SPEEDY TRIAL OF CRIMINALS, AND ASCERTAINING THEIR PUNISHMENT 
IN THE COUNTY COURTS WHEN PROSECUTED THERE, AND FOR THE PAYMENT OF FEES DUE FROM 
CRIMINAL PERSONS (Md. 1715) (“[A]ny person or persons whatsoever, that have been convicted of 
the crimes aforesaid, or other crimes, or that shall be of the same evil, or a vagrant, or dissolute 
liver, that shall shoot, kill or hunt, or seen to carry a gun, upon any person’s land . . . shall forfeit 
and pay one thousand pounds of tobacco.”); THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE 
MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787) 
(“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and their own state . . . 
unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.”).  See also THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 675 (B. Schwartz ed., 1971) (Samuel stated the right to 
arms should “never [be] construed . . . to prevent the people of the United States citizens who are 
peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms.”); MASSACHUSETTS SPY (Boston, MA), Mar. 28, 
1771, at 14, col. 3 (“Justly does the law presume that every wrong is committed with force and 
arms: for every wrong inferred being against the peace, must require force to support it.  As force 
therefore must in one shape or other, be repelled by force, it clearly follows, that there must be 
somewhere in civil society, a force sufficient to protect the honest, industrious and peaceable 
citizen.”); JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 13 (Newbern, 
James Davis 1774) (“[A]ny Justice of the Peace may command Weapons to be taken from a 
Prisoner brought before him”). 
 81. Such restrictions can be found in laws concerning riots, tumults, and assemblies of 
persons in arms, see AN ACT TO PREVENT ROUTS, RIOTS, AND TUMULTUOUS ASSEMBLIES, AND THE 
EVIL CONSEQUENCES THEREOF, SEPTEMBER SESSION, CHAPTER VIII (Mass. 1786); AN ACT FOR 
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THE MORE SPEEDY AND EFFECTUAL SUPPRESSION OF TUMULTS AND INSURRECTIONS IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH, SEPTEMBER SESSION, CHAPTER IX (Mass. 1787); AN ACT TO PREVENT ROUTS, 
RIOTS, AND TUMULTUOUS ASSEMBLIES (N.J. 1797); AN ACT TO PREVENT HUNTING WITH FIRE-
ARMS IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK, AND THE LIBERTIES THEREOF (N.Y. 1763); AN ACT AGAINST 
RIOTS AND RIOTERS (Pa. 1705).  See also AN ACT TO RESTRAIN TAVERN-KEEPERS AND OTHERS 
FROM SELLING STRONG LIQUORS TO SERVANTS . . . AND FROM HUNTING OR CARRYING A GUN ON 
THE LORD’S DAY (N.J. 1751).  At the same time, however, the government can require individuals 
to carry arms for the public security similar to the hue & cry.  See AN ACT TO OBLIGE THE MALE 
WHITE PERSONS IN THE PROVINCE OF GEORGIA TO CARRY FIRE-ARMS IN ALL PLACES OF PUBLICK 
WORSHIP (Ga. 1757); AN ACT FOR ESTABLISHING AND REGULATING PATROLS (Ga. 1757); AN ACT 
FOR THE BETTER ESTABLISHING AND REGULATING OF PATROLS IN THIS PROVINCE (S.C. 1744); 
DAVIS, supra note 80, at 13 (“Justices of the Peace, upon their own view, or upon Complaint, may 
apprehend any Person who shall go or ride armed with unusual and offensive Weapons, in an 
Affray, or among any great Concourse of the People, or who shall appear, so armed, before the 
King’s Justices sitting in Court.”); JAMES PARKER, THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS . . . ADAPTED TO 
THESE UNITED STATES 11-12 (New York, John Patterson 1788) (“[T]hat no man cannot excuse the 
wearing such armour in public, by alledging that such a one threatened him, and that he wears it for 
the safety of his person from his assault.”); BURN’S ABRIDGEMENT, OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE, 
CONTAINING THE WHOLE PRACTICE, AUTHORITY AND DUTY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, WITH 
CORRECT FORMS OF PRECEDENTS RELATING THERETO, AND ADAPTED TO THE PRESENT SITUATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (2d ed., Dover, Eliphalet Ladd 1792) (”[I]n some cases there may be an 
affray, where there is no actual violence; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual 
weapons, in such a manner as will naturally cause terror to the people; which is said to have been 
always an offence at the common law, and strictly prohibited by statute.”).  See also supra notes 83, 
85 for other sources. 
 82. 25 Edw. 3, St. 5, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.) (if “any Man of this Realm ride armed covertly 
or secretly with Men of Arms against any other . . . shall be judge Treason”); 1 Jac.1, c. 8 (1603-4) 
(Eng.) (also known as the Statute of Stabbing).  For evidence that Edward III’s statute was still in 
force in the United States, see FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF 
PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATES OF NORTH CAROLINA 60-61 (Newbern 1792) 
(confirming that no person may go ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the 
presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere); A COLLECTION OF ALL 
SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS 
ARE NOW IN FORCE 33 (1794) (confirming that no person may go ride armed by night nor by day, in 
fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, nor in no part 
elsewhere). 
 83. 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.) (“Because people have “willfully and shamefully 
committed, perpetrated and done diuerse detestable and shamefull murders, robberies, felonies, riots 
and routs with Crossbowes, little short handguns, and little haquebuts, to the great peril and 
continual feare and danger of the kings loving subjects.”); 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.) 
(requiring all lawful guns “being not the length of one whole yard, or haquebut, or demy hake, 
being not of the length of three quarters of a year x. li. sterling.”).  Writing in 1782, Granville Sharp 
attested to the validity of such restrictions.  See GRANVILLE SHARP, TRACTS, CONCERNING THE 
ANCIENT AND ONLY TRUE LEGAL MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, BY A FREE MILITIA 17-18 (3d 
ed. London, Dilly 1782); Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 411-14.  For 
evidence that Henry VIII’s statutes were still in place at the Founding Era, see 1 GILES JACOB, A 
NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms” (T.E. Tomlins ed., London, Andrew Strahan 1797) 
(citing 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.) as a lawful restriction on 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.)); 1 
GILES JACOB, THE LAW-DICTIONARY EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE OF 
THE ENGLISH LAW 123 (T.E. Tomlins ed., Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1811) (citing 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 
(1541-42) (Eng.) as a lawful restriction on 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.)). 
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of arms,84 and the discharging of arms in public.85  With the exception of 
regulations designed to prevent “public injury,”86 regulations that fall 
within these traditional restraints should be viewed under a rationale 
basis standard of review.87
Critics of this approach will argue that the McDonald plurality 
defined the Second Amendment as a “fundamental” right and it should 
be treated as such.
  In other words, traditional regulations circa 
1791 should be analyzed under a low standard of scrutiny unless the 
challenging party can show that the founding fathers would have thought 
such regulations were not constitutionally permissible.  It is when the 
challenging party succeeds that the courts should move to step two. 
88  Therefore, they will argue that all regulations 
should be examined according to the “strict scrutiny” standard of review 
as are other enumerated “fundamental rights,” or at a minimum a 
heightened “intermediate scrutiny” standard.89
 
 84. At the founding it was well established that it was within the power of government to 
prevent persons from going riding armed. 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (“That no Man . . . [is] to go or nor 
ride armed by Night nor by Day in Fairs, Markets, nor in the Presence of the Justices or other 
Ministers nor in no Part elsewhere.”); 7 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1383) (Eng.); 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) 
(Eng.).See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148-49 (1769) (“The offence of riding 
or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by 
terrifying the good people of the land; and is particularly prohibited by the statute of Northampton, 
2 Edw. 2, C.3 upon pain of forfeiture of arms.”). 
  This article does not 
dispute that enumerated “fundamental” rights should be afforded higher 
levels of scrutiny.  However, neither the Heller majority nor the divided 
McDonald plurality defined any Second Amendment rights as 
 85. For English examples, see 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.) (limiting the shooting of arms 
“to shoot with any Handgun Demie hake, or Haquebut at any Butt or Banke of earth only in place 
convenient for the same”).  For some American examples, see AN ACT TO PREVENT THE FIRING OF 
GUNS, AND OTHER FIRE-ARMS WITHIN THIS COLONY (N.Y. 1773); AN ACT TO SUPPRESS THE 
DISORDERLY PRACTICE OF FIRING GUNS, &C. ON THE TIMES THEREIN MENTIONED (Pa. 1774); AN 
ACT FOR THE BETTER ORDERING AND GOVERNING OF THE NEGROES AND OTHER SLAVES IN THIS 
PROVINCE, XXIII (S.C. 1740); AN ACT FOR SUPPRESSING AND PROHIBITING EVER SPECIES OF 
GAMING…AND ALSO FOR RESTRAINING THE DISORDERLY PRACTICE OF DISCHARGING FIRE ARMS 
AT CERTAIN HOURS AND PLACES (Ohio 1790); 1 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 228, 248, 261, 437, 
480 (William Walter Hening ed., New York 1823) (laws against shooting); 2 VIRGINIA STATUTES 
AT LARGE 126 (William Walter Hening ed., New York 1823) (laws against shooting). 
 86. See supra note 77. 
 87. This article understands that the Heller majority rejected adopting a baseline “rational 
basis” standard of review for examining the constitutionality of gun restrictions.  District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27 (2008). However, the majority also acquiesced to 
“longstanding prohibitions.”  See id. at 2816-17.  Thus, this article argues if certain types of 
regulations were accepted by the public in the late eighteenth century, in what many Individual 
Right Scholars characterize as an era of liberal gun possession and use, it must certainly pass 
constitutional muster today. 
 88. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036. 
 89. See Robert A. Levy, Second Amendment Redux: Scrutiny, Incorporation, and the Heller 
Paradox,33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 208 (2010). 
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“fundamental” other than “the right to possess a handgun in the home for 
the purpose of self-defense,”90 and the Court has yet to revisit the 
Second Amendment in the constraints of a “well-regulated militia” 
right.91
This begets the important question, “What if a traditional restriction 
on arms expressly conflicts with the limited right recognized in Heller?”  
On its face, it seems that restrictions on felons, criminals, the mentally 
ill, and aliens possessing handguns for defense of the home would 
qualify in this regard.  However, the Heller majority made it clear that 
the right only extends to “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms 
in defense of hearth and home.”
 
92
Naturally, this still leaves one historical and traditional restriction 
without an affirmative judicial standard of review.  Specifically, the 
government has been traditionally allowed to pass firearms restrictions 
as to prevent “public injury.”  Given the broad nature of what may 
qualify as a constitutionally permissible restriction to protect the public 
from “injury,” restrictions that fall squarely within or intimately relate to 
this category should be given a slightly heightened form of scrutiny than 
that of the other historical or traditional restrictions—a low to medium 
level of intermediate scrutiny.  This standard is based on the popular 
understanding of the Founders’ right to arms.  In other words, “public 
injury” restrictions should not warrant “strict scrutiny” unless the 
“public injury” restriction expressly restricts the limited right recognized 
in Heller.
  In other words, the Heller majority 
acquiesced to the longstanding ideological restraints for the “keeping” or 
“bearing” of arms—a factor that the “historical guidepost” standard 
takes into account.  What qualifies as a “law-abiding” citizen can be 
debated back and forth, but longstanding ideological restraints can 
definitively provide courts with a strong historical and philosophical 
base to work from. 
93  Support for adopting this standard for traditional “public 
injury” restrictions can be found in the Heller majority’s reliance94
 
 90. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
 on 
the Pennsylvania Minority proposal, which states: 
 91. See Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 53 (Story, J., dissenting) (stating that the Second 
Amendment “confirms and illustrates” the States’ concurrent authority over the militia, “rather than 
impugns” it); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (stating that State regulations limiting the 
assemblage, training, or discharging of arms would not violate the Second Amendment because it 
does not “prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of 
their rightful resource for maintaining the public security”). 
 92. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821, 2831. 
 93. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 94. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2804. 
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That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves 
and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing 
game, and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of 
them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury 
from individuals; and as standing armies in time of peace are 
dangerous to liberty, they ought not be kept up; and that the military 
shall be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil 
powers.95
The Heller majority’s classification of the proposal as “highly 
influential”
 
96 gives credence to the legal argument that even broad 
individual and state rights proponents “viewed the right to possess and 
carry arms as limited—particularly from those who had committed 
crimes or were a danger to the public.”97  What is also legally significant 
is that the Minority’s proposal does not protect a right to “keep arms.”98
 
 95. THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF THE 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (Dec. 17, 1787) (emphasis in original). 
  
 96. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2804.  The Minority Report is especially important because it is a 
provision that Individual Right advocates have consistently relied on to support their understanding 
of the right to arms.  It was one of their main arguments supporting an individual right even though 
its language was not included in the Second Amendment.  However, while they embrace the 
“defence of themselves” and “hunting” language they cast aside the rest of the proposal.  One 
cannot have it both ways.  See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 
1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1406-7 (1998) (“[W]e know that ‘bear’ was used with a broad meaning in 
one of the key documents that gave birth to the Second Amendment: the minority report from the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention. The minority demanded constitutional protection for the right of 
the people ‘to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or 
for the purpose of killing game.’  Hunting—‘killing game’—is obviously a personal, non-militia 
purpose for which one could ‘bear arms.’”); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s 
Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1996) (“[T]hose responsible for the adoption of the Second 
Amendment generally accepted the individual right of self-defense as the natural basis for the right 
to arms.  Like Blackstone . . . the people who gave us the Second Amendment drew no fundamental 
distinction between an individual's right to defend himself against a robber or a marauding Indian 
and that same individual's right to band together with others in a state regulated militia.  The 
inseparability of these concepts was reflected in two early state constitutions . . . [including] the 
Anti-Federalist minority at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention.”); Stephen P. Halbrook, St. 
George Tucker’s Second Amendment: Deconstructing “The True Palladium of Liberty,” 3 TENN. J. 
L. & POL’Y 120, 159-60 (2007). 
 97. United States v. Tooley, No. 3:09-00194, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58591, at *28 (S.D. WV 
June 14, 2010).  For support for this interpretation, see CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra 
note 15, at 40; Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 365-66, 373-73, 376, 382-83, 
405 (discussing how the government retained unfettered authority to disarm “dangerous and 
disaffected persons” despite the 1689 Declaration of Rights “have arms” provision). 
 98. By 1792, only one state constitution protected the right to “keep arms,” and that was for 
the “common defence.”  MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XVII (“The people have a right to keep and 
bear arms for the common defence.”).  See also David Thomas Konig, Arms and the Man: What 
Did the Right to “Keep” Arms Mean in the Early Republic?, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 177 (2007) 
(discussing that “keep arms” was not an unfettered right). 
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Historically, who may “keep arms” was an issue that had always been a 
matter of state sovereignty conditioned on allegiance to the laws and 
government.99
Perhaps what makes the Minority’s proposal so “highly influential” 
for courts in analyzing restrictions on “arms” is the fact that it was 
published throughout the colonies
  This is supported by 1789 and 1803 State Second 
Amendment analogues, which omit the right to “keep arms” except in 
reference to the “common defence” or the “State.”  See Chart I (“State 
Second Amendment Analogues Circa 1803”). 
100 and not one reply disputed its 
contentions on the disarming of criminals or restrictions to prevent 
“public injury.”101
But to complete the list of unalienable rights, you would insert a clause 
in your declaration, that every body shall, in good weather, hunt on his 
own land, and catch fish in rivers that are public property.  Here, 
Gentlemen, you must have exerted the whole force of your genius!  
Not even the all-important subject of legislating for a world can 
restrain my laughter at this clause!  As a supplement to that article of 
your bill of rights, I would suggest the following restriction: “That 
Congress shall never restrain any inhabitant of America from eating 
and drinking, at seasonable times, or prevent his lying on his left side, 
in a long winter’s night, or even on his back, when he is fatigued by 
lying on his right.” . . . But to be more serious Gentlemen, you must 
  It seems only Noah Webster, signing under the pen 
name America, addressed the Minority’s understanding of arms within 
the constraints of the federal Constitution.  However, Webster only 
addressed the subject through the auspices of hunting, and chastised the 
Minority for even asserting a right to hunt: 
 
 99. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at 
43.  See also infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing “keep arms” in State constitutions). 
 100. PENNSYLVANIA EVENING HERALD (Philadelphia, PA), Dec. 15, 1787, at 2, cols. 4-5; THE 
INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Philadelphia, PA), Dec. 17, 1787, at 2; THE FREEMAN’S JOURNAL 
(Philadelphia, PA), Dec. 19, 1787, at 1, cols. 1-3; THE CARLISLE GAZETTE (Carlisle, PA), Dec. 26, 
1787, at 3, cols. 1-3; THE DAILY ADVERTISER (New York, NY), Dec. 22, 1787, at 2, cols. 2-4; THE 
PROVIDENCE GAZETTE AND COUNTRY JOURNAL, Jan. 19, 1788, at 1, cols. 1-3; THE PROVIDENCE 
GAZETTE AND COUNTRY JOURNAL, Jan. 26, 1788, at 1, cols. 1-3; THE UNITED STATES CHRONICLE 
(Providence, RI), Feb. 14, 1788, at 4, cols. 1-2. 
 101. See THE INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Philadelphia, PA), Jan. 16, 1788, at 2, cols. 2-3; THE 
CARLISLE GAZETTE (Carlisle, PA), Feb. 13, 1788, at 1, cols. 3-4; THE DAILY ADVERTISER (New 
York, NY), Dec. 31, 1787, at 1, col. 4; THE DAILY ADVERTISER (New York, NY), Jan. 12, 1788, at 
2, col. 2 (“The next consideration is, whether the liberties of the people will be safe under the 
Constitution proffered to us by the late Convention?  To determine this very important question, I 
contend it is by no means necessary to go into a minute investigation of every part.  It is amply 
sufficient for this purpose, if a few leading principles have been carefully attended to.”); JAMES 
MADISON, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: WITH AN 
ATTEMPT TO ANSWER SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE TO IT 23, 30-31 
(Petersburg, VA 1788). 
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have had in idea the forest-laws in Europe, when you inserted that 
article; For no circumstances that ever took place in America, could 
have suggested the thought of a declaration in favor of hunting and 
fishing.  Will you forever persist in error? . . . You may just as well ask 
for a clause, giving license for every man to till his own land, or milk 
his own cows.102
To clarify how this differing “public injury” classification would 
look in the constraints of the “historical guidepost” standard of review, 
this article will examine the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), 
which provides, “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been 
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to  
. . . possess . . . any firearm.”  Arguably, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) can be 
viewed as a traditional restriction on felons, but for the purposes of this 
article it will be viewed in the light of a “public injury” classification 
because a recidivist violent misdemeanant does not historically or 
legally equate with a felon. 
 
Before analyzing § 922(g)(9), this article will use the “historical 
guidepost” standard of review to analyze the historical restriction of 
discharging firearms.  In particular, this article will address a 
hypothetical law that restricts the shooting, firing, or discharging of 
firearms with the exception of lawful self-defense in the home.  To many 
this law can seem like a reasonable restriction, but to others it may be 
seen as an infringement on their property rights—both real and 
personal—or as an infringement of their right to train to effectuate a 
“well-regulated militia.” 
B. The Constitutionality of Regulations on Discharging of Firearms 
Under the “Historical Guidepost Standard” of Review 
As discussed above, traditional regulations that would have been 
publicly accepted circa 1791 should be upheld unless the challenging 
party can show that the founding fathers would have thought such 
regulations were not constitutionally permissible.  The threshold judicial 
query is not whether the restriction at issue has a 1791 parallel, but 
whether there is sufficient historical evidence to suggest that it was 
publicly accepted.  Perhaps in no area does the “historical guidepost” 
standard of review control then to the discharging of firearms on public 
 
 102. THE DAILY ADVERTISER (New York, NY), Dec. 31, 1787, at 2, col. 3 (emphasis in 
original).  See also NOAH WEBSTER, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND FUGITIVE WRITINGS: ON 
MORAL, HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY SUBJECTS 149 (Scholars’ Facsimile & Reprints 
1977) (1790). 
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or private property.  Limitations on the discharging of “arms” dates back 
to 1541 when Parliament passed a statute limiting the firing of any 
“Handgun Demie hake, or Haquebut” toonly a “Butt or Banke of earth . . 
. convenient for the same.”103
Naturally, public safety was the consideration in putting such a 
restriction in place and the colonies passed similar laws with public 
safety in mind.  For instance, in 1773, New York made it unlawful for 
“any Person or Persons of any Age or Quality” to “fire or discharge any 
Gun, Pistol . . . or other Fire-work” in “any House, Barn, or other 
Building, or before any Door, or in any Garden, Street, Lane, or other 
Inclosure[.]”
 
104  Ten years earlier, New York had passed a similar 
ordinance restricting the carrying or discharging of firearms on public 
lands without a license.105  It also prevented the carrying or discharging 
of firearms on private lands unless authorized by the “Owner, Proprieter, 
or Possessor[.]”106
Surprisingly, the most expansive law concerning the discharging of 
firearms in the United States was not in an established city such as 
Boston, New York or Philadelphia, but on the expansive Northwestern 
Territory.  At a time when the Second Amendment would have directly 
applied to this federal territory, a 1790 statute touched upon the 
negligent discharging of firearms in populated areas such as “streets and 
[in the] vicinity of cities, towns, villages and stations[.]”  It stated: 
 
That if any person shall presume to discharge or fire, or cause to be 
discharged or fired, any gun or other fire-arms at any mark or object, 
or upon any pretence whatever, unless he or she shall at the same time 
be with such gun or fire-arms at the distance of at least one quarter of a 
mile from the nearest building of any such city, town, village or 
station, such person shall for every such offence, forfeit and pay to use 
of the county in which the same shall be committed, a sum not 
exceeding five dollars, nor less than one dollar.  And if any person 
being within a quarter of a mile of any city, town, village or station as 
aforesaid, shall at the same time willfully discharge or fire any gun or 
fire-arms, or cause to procure the same to be discharged or fired, at any 
time after the setting of the sun and before the rising of the same, he or 
 
 103. 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.). 
 104. AN ACT TO PREVENT THE FIRING OF GUNS, AND OTHER FIRE-ARMS WITHIN THIS COLONY 
(N.Y. 1773). 
 105. AN ACT TO PREVENT HUNTING WITH FIRE-ARMS IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK, AND THE 
LIBERTIES THEREOF (N.Y. 1763). 
 106. Id. 
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she so offending, shall in like manner pay to the use aforesaid, a sum 
not exceeding five dollars, nor less than one dollar . . . .107
At no point did the law deny the use of “arms” for lawful purposes 
prescribed by the legislature, such as the Heller right of armed self-
defense in the home with a handgun,
 
108
That nothing herein contained shall be deemed or construed to extend 
to any person lawfully using fire-arms as offensive or defensive 
weapons, in annoying, or opposing a common enemy, or defending his 
or her person or property, or the person or property of any other, 
against the invasions or depredations of an enemy, or in support of the 
laws and government; or against the attacks of rebels, highwaymen, 
robbers, thieves, or other unlawfully assailing him or her, or in any 
other manner where such opposition, defence, or resistance is allowed 
by the law of the land.
 for it stated: 
109
Thus, given that laws governing the discharging of firearms in 
private and public places were understood as permissible circa 1791, 
courts can assume modern laws governing the subject are within the 
constitutional constraints of the Second Amendment.  Certainly, almost 
all laws governing the discharging of firearms, including the placement 
of limitations on the discharging of handguns for self-defense in the 
home, would pass strict scrutiny.  However, under the “historical 
guidepost” standard of review the court can mitigate this scrutiny to a 
“rational basis” standard of review. 
 
The result does not change if one was to argue that laws preventing 
the discharging of firearms are in violation of the Second Amendment’s 
“well-regulated militia” guarantee.  First, the Constitution prescribes that 
the States have plenary authority to “train[] the Militia according to the 
discipline prescribed by Congress.”110  This authority includes the power 
to prescribe the time, place, and manner in which the discharging of 
firearms may take place to effectuate the national or state militias.111
 
 107. AN ACT FOR SUPPRESSING AND PROHIBITING EVER SPECIES OF GAMING . . . AND ALSO 
FOR RESTRAINING THE DISORDERLY PRACTICE OF DISCHARGING FIRE ARMS AT CERTAIN HOURS 
AND PLACES, § 4 (Ohio 1790). 
  
Second, there are numerous historical examples that the individual 
exercise and discharging of arms does not accomplish or effectuate a 
 108. At no point does the law use or incorporate a form of the phrase “bear arms.”  CHARLES, 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 138.  For a textual and historical analysis of the Ohio 
right to “bear arms,” see id. at 133-57. 
 109. See supra note 107 (emphasis in original). 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 16. 
 111. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1886). 
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“well-regulated militia.”112  Lastly, any argument that grants people a 
right to assemble and train as a militia, absent the consent of the political 
branches, runs afoul of the founding principle that the military shall 
always be subordinate to the civil authorities.113
C. The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) Under the 
“Historical Guidepost Standard” of Review 
 
In the recent Skoien en banc decision, both the majority and the 
dissent touched upon “historical guideposts” in determining the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).  The majority only briefly 
addressed gun control circa 1791, citing the Pennsylvania Minority 
proposal and laying the claim that the founders “did not extend this right 
[to bear arms] to persons convicted of crime.”114
 
 112. See TIMOTHY PICKERING, AN EASY PLAN OF DISCIPLINE FOR A MILITIA, preface at 6 
(Samuel & Ebenezer Hall, Salem 1775) (“An exercise ought to include not only every action 
necessary to be performed in a day of battle, but also all such as may be useful on any other 
occasion or duty . . . to keep the men alert, to save time, and to throw as many shot as possible at 
your enemy, with uniformity, to prevent the interruptions of each other, the confusion and dangerous 
accidents which would inevitably happen, if the men in close order took each his own way to 
perform an action.”); WILLIAM BRETON, MILITIA DISCIPLINE, at “To the Reader” (2d ed., London 
1717) (“[W]ithout [militia] practice, and exercise . . . the unskil[l]ful Bearers, but too often prove 
Dangerous, and Hurtful, both to themselves, and Fellows, that Rank and File with them.”).  See also 
AN ACT FOR REGULATING AND GOVERNING THE MILITIA OF THE STATE OF VERMONT, AND FOR 
REPEALING ALL LAWS HERETOFORE FOR THAT PURPOSE § 36 (Vt. 1793) (“Whereas the good 
citizens of this State, are often injured by the discharge of single guns . . . no commissioned officer, 
or private, shall unnecessarily fire a musket, or single gun, in any public road, or near any house, or 
near the place of parade . . . unless embodied under the command of some officers.”); AN ACT FOR 
FORMING AND REGULATING THE MILITIA WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS…FOR THAT PURPOSE, at 15 (Mass. 1781) (“That no Soldier . . . shall 
unnecessarily discharge his Firelock from and after his appearing . . . on a Training or Muster-Day, 
without the express Order or License of his Superior Officer.”); An Act for Establishing and 
Conducting the Military Force of New Jersey § 53 (N.J. 1806), reprinted in MILITIA LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY (Wilson & Halet, Trenton 1806) (“That it shall not be lawful for 
any . . . private to come on parade with a loaded or charged musket.”). 
  However, the majority 
 113. This was frequently conveyed in State constitutions. See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (“The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the 
common defence . . . and the military shall always be held in exact subordination to the civil 
authority and governed by it.”); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (“That 
the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State…the military should be kept under 
strict subordination to, and governed by the civil power.”); OHIO CONST. of 1802 art. VIII, § 20 
(“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state: and as 
standing armies in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be kept up; and that the 
military shall be kept under strict subordination to the civil power.”).  See also Charles, The Right of 
Self-Preservation and Resistance, supra note 15, at 31-34, 41-43, 47-49, 54, 58-59 (discussing the 
politics and reasons concerning placing this power with the political branches). 
 114. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g en banc, No. 08-
3770, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6584, *6 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010), and on reh’g en banc No. 08-3770, 
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circumvented any further historical review.  Implying the lack of a 1791 
historical parallel, the court jumped to the second part of the “historical 
guidepost standard” of review and analyzed § 922(g)(9) under a 
heightened intermediate scrutiny standard.115
Meanwhile, the dissent gave more deference to the use of 
“historical guideposts” in analyzing § 922(g)(9).  While this article 
agrees with the dissent that the en banc court should have given more 
deference to the “historical guideposts,” it disagrees with the dissent’s 
approach in compiling historical resources.  What is particularly 
concerning is that the dissent only cited analyses that support broad 
protections of the right to arms and ignored longstanding ideological 
restraints on the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms—the very judicial bias 
that Justice Stevens was concerned with.
 
116
Another problem with the dissent’s analysis is that it utterly negates 
the Pennsylvania Minority proposal by claiming that its 
acknowledgement of governmental power to disarm persons for “crimes 
committed” or who may be a “real danger” to “public injury” “did not 
find its way into the Second Amendment.”
 
117  In support of this 
argument, the dissent alludes to the fact that the 1791 Second 
Amendment analogues did not exclude “persons convicted of crime.”118  
As will be shown in the next section and Chart I (“State Second 
Amendment Analogues Circa 1803”), this kind of selective 
interpretation of historical sources and State Second Amendment 
analogues treads upon dangerous grounds.  If the courts are to take 
anything from the history of the right to arms119
 
2010 WL 2735747 (7th Cir. July 13, 2010) (citing STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ 
SECOND AMENDMENT 273, supra note 27 (2008)); C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart 
have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 700-13 (2009). 
 in State analogues circa 
 115. Skoien, 2010 U. S. App. LEXIS 14262, at *8. 
 116. Stevens’ concern was the historical approach could still lead to judicial bias, because 
judges will not know which “pieces to credit and which to discount, and then . . . assemble them 
into a coherent whole.”  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3117 (2010).The dissent 
did not cite or incorporate the work of one Ph.D. Historian specializing in Anglo-American legal 
history or Colonial/Early American history or a work that has gained the support of historical 
academia in its historical analysis.  See Skoien, 2010 U. S. App. LEXIS 14262, at *22-51 (Sykes, J., 
dissenting). 
 117. Skoien, 2010 U. S. App. LEXIS 142662 at *31. 
 118. Id.  MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XVII (“The people have a right to keep and bear arms for 
the common defence.”); PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. XIII (“That the right of citizens to bear arms for 
the defence of themselves and the State.”); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XVII (“That the people have a 
right to bear arms, for the defence of the State.”); VT. CONST. OF 1786, art. XVIII (“That the people 
have a right to bear arms, for defence of themselves and the State.”). 
 119. See generally Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” 
supra note 15. 
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1791, it is that a “well-regulated militia” was seen as superior to the right 
to “bear arms” and the right to “keep arms” was non-existent in 
“individual right” analogues.120
Regarding a proper “historical guidepost” standard of review in 
analyzing § 922(g)(9), the threshold judicial query is whether the 
disarming of recidivist violent misdemeanants falls within the traditional 
or historical “public injury” restrictions on firearms that would have 
been publicly accepted at the time of the founding.  The issue is not 
finding an exact parallel to a 1791 restriction.  It is whether it would 
have been publicly accepted according to longstanding ideological and 
philosophical constraints that the founders understood. 
 
To begin, a court must work within the constraints of Heller and 
take into account that the Supreme Court recognized that the “right to 
keep and bear arms” is deeply rooted in our Anglo origins.121  Assuming 
the Heller majority’s historical interpretation as the true and correct 
version given the constraints of judicial review,122 the courts must work 
within this framework and assume that, “By the time of the founding, the 
right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects.”123  It 
was a right that “unlike some other English rights . . . was codified in a 
written Constitution.”124
Logically, given that the founders borrowed their understanding of 
the right to arms from their English ancestors, they would have also 
borrowed and understood the permissible restrictions on the right,
 
125 
including the right to “keep arms.”  This is significant because 
Parliament and the crown possessed virtually unchecked authority to 
disarm “dangerous and disaffected” persons as a means to preserve 
public safety and government.126  This power remained unchecked and 
unquestioned despite the recognition of the right of Protestants to “have 
arms for their defence.”127
 
 120. In 1791, five state constitutions protected the right to a “well-regulated militia” compared 
to four “bear arms” analogues.  Furthermore, not one state “bear arms” analogue protected a right to 
“keep arms” other than for the “common defence.” See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text. 
 
 121. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798 (2008). 
 122. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing the legal restraints on litigating 
history and that the “historical guidepost” approach requires working within those interpretative 
restraints no matter whether that history corresponds with historical academia). 
 123. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798. 
 124. Id. at 2801. 
 125. United States v. Marzzarella, No. 09-3185, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15655, at *12-13 (3rd 
Cir. July 29, 2010). 
 126. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 356-403. 
 127. Id.; 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.). 
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In fact, the seventeenth-century English print culture reveals the 
importance of the common consent of the people, i.e., Parliament, in 
determining who was “dangerous” and could be restricted from bearing 
arms.  John Sadler wrote that it was within parliamentary power to 
determine “how, and when, and where it shall seem good” for 
individuals to bear arms.128  Sadler felt “all matters of History, telleth 
us” the “general Custom was; Not to entrust any man with bearing Arms 
. . . till some Common Council, more or less, had approved him.”129  
Similarly, in a 1658 tract entitled The Leveller, it stated that the power 
over arming the people rested with Parliament because it is “prudent and 
safe for the People to be masters of their own Arms, and to be 
commanded in the use of them by a part of themselves, (that is their 
Parliaments) whose interest is the same with theirs.”130
This English history of the right to arms is significant for many 
reasons under the “historical guidepost” approach.  Perhaps most 
importantly because the Heller majority recognized that the founding 
fathers codified the English right into the Constitution as the Second 
Amendment.
 
131  The difference between the English “have arms” 
provision and the Second Amendment being that the latter is not 
dependent on privileges of wealth or birth.  Early constitutional 
commentators were in agreement on this historical and legal fact.  For 
instance, St. George Tucker distinguished the two provisions, writing 
that the difference is that “the right of bearing arms is confined to 
protestants, and the words suitable to their condition and degree[.]”132
 
 128. JOHN SADLER, RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM, OR, CUSTOMS OF OUR ANCESTORS, TOUCHING 
THE DUTY, POWER, ELECTION, OR SUCCESSION OF OUR KINGS AND PARLIAMENTS, OUR TRUE 
LIBERTY, DUE ALLEGIANCE, THREE ESTATES, THEIR LEGISLATIVE POWER, ORIGINAL, JUDICIAL, 
AND EXECUTIVE, WITH THE MILITIA, FREELY DISCUSSED THROUGH THE BRITISH, SAXON, NORMAN 
LAWS AND HISTORIES, WITH AN OCCASIONAL DISCOURSE OF GREAT CHANGES YET EXPECTED IN 
THE WORLD 159 (London, n. pub. 1682) (emphasis in original). 
  
Tucker would similarly write in his edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries 
that the Second Amendment differed in that the “right of the people to 
keep and bear arms” is “without any qualification as to their condition or 
 129. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 130. THE LEVELLER, OR, THE PRINCIPLES & MAXIMS CONCERNING GOVERNMENT AND 
RELIGION, WHICH ARE ASSERTED BY THOSE THAT ARE COMMONLY CALLED, LEVELLERS 9 
(London, n. pub. 1658). 
 131. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798, 2801 (2008); See also Marzzarella, 
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15655, at *12-13. 
 132. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH 
SELECTED WRITINGS 239 (Clyde N. Wilson fwd., 1999).  The phrase “suitable to their condition or 
degree” was in reference to the fact that access to arms was based on socio-economic and hierarchal 
status; what is known as the “chain-of-being.”  See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 
15, at 358, 365, 378-80, 383, 385-86, 396, 398-99, 402, 403, 407. 
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degree, as is the case in the British government.”133  William Rawle also 
concluded that the “right to keep and bear arms” was “secured to 
protestant subjects only, on the revolution of 1688; and it is cautiously 
described to be that of bearing arms for their defence, ‘suitable to their 
conditions and as allowed by law.’”134
This evidence supports that the founding fathers understood and 
accepted the English understanding of the right to “have arms” and its 
constitutional limitations.  This would have included understanding the 
constitutionality of firearm restrictions on “dangerous and disaffected” 
persons.  While gun control laws circa 1791 do not draw an exact 
parallel to the § 922(g)(9) disarming of recidivist violent 
misdemeanants, the founding fathers understood the legal concept of the 
law-abiding or virtuous citizen.
 
135
The Pennsylvania Minority proposal supports this understanding of 
the right to arms, for they were willing to grant the federal government 
great latitude in deciding who may “keep arms” and where such arms 
may be “kept.”
  Thus, the right to bear arms was 
unequivocally connected to individuals being in support of just 
government and its laws. 
136
 
 133. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE 
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 143 n.40  (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Birch & Small 
1803). 
  Thus, in many respects the Pennsylvania Minority’s 
right to “bear arms” resembled its English predecessor, where 
Parliament gave the crown nearly unfettered discretion to disarm 
 134. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
126 (2d ed. Philadelphia, Nicklin 1829). 
 135. See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins 
of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 492 (2004); Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in 
the Early Republic, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 130 (1986); Charles, The Constitutional 
Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at 18-21, 46-47; MARTIN POST, AN 
ORATION DELIVERED AT CORNWALL ON THE 5TH DAY OF JULY, A.D. 1802, FOR THE ANNIVERSARY 
OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 9 (1802) (“Virtue is the palladium of liberty and the bulwark of the 
rights of the man.”); 2 ALEXANDER ADDISON, REPORTS OF CASES IN THE COUNTY COURTS OF THE 
FIFTH CIRCUIT . . . OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 150-51 (Philadelphia, Colerch & May 1800) 
(“[V]irtue is the principle of a republican government” and to “produce public good, there must be 
public virtue on the whole people; for in the hands of the whole people is the authority and force of 
the nation really vested.”); THE GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia, PA), Nov. 9, 1791, 
at 221, col. 1 (“Let it then be the glory of every American to have arms in his hands, with some 
knowledge how to use them, on proper occasions, against the enemies of his country: and let it be 
established, as a point of honour, and the criterion of a virtuous citizen, to pay the greatest deference 
to the common and necessary laws of a camp.”). 
 136. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 39-40.  See also infra notes 196-
206 and accompanying text (discussing State Second Amendment analogues). 
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“disaffected and dangerous” persons.137Furthermore, the fact that the 
founding fathers exercised similar discretion when they disarmed 
dangerous and disaffected persons throughout the American Revolution 
supports that the founders would have publicly accepted the disarming 
of recidivist violent misdemeanants who repeatedly show a disregard for 
the laws of the community.138
Certainly, drawing historical parallels between § 922(g)(9) and the 
broad allowance granted to 1791 legislatures to disarm “dangerous and 
disaffected” persons is not a perfect historical fit.  However, finding an 
exact historical parallel between a contemporary regulation and 1791 is a 
rare occurrence.  History seeks to provide the truth, leaving many 
questions unanswered.  The law works differently, but it must co-exist 
with historical methodologies.  It requires jurists to find answers to 
issues, cases, and controversies based on the same historical evidence 
that historians use.  So long as jurists are honest and maintain a 
“historical consciousness,” their use of “historical guideposts” does not 
offend the Constitution. 
 
In the constraints of the “historical guidepost” standard of review, 
the use of “historical guideposts” does not require linking § 922(g)(9) to 
a 1791 restriction to qualify as “publicly accepted.”  The question the 
courts have to ask is whether the founder’s understanding of the right to 
arms would have accepted the restriction as necessary to prevent “public 
injury.”  As Justice Scalia wrote in his McDonald concurrence, the 
historical method does not have to be the “perfect means . . . but whether 
it is the best means available in an imperfect world.”139  In other words, 
the historical issue is whether under “any historical methodology, under 
any plausible standard of proof, would lead to the same conclusion.”140
 
 137. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 356-403. 
  
To phrase it another way, the § 922(g)(9) question is whether there is a 
longstanding ideological consensus circa 1791 for regulating or 
restricting the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms of recidivist violent 
misdemeanants that would have been accepted by the founding fathers.  
Given the Founders’ emphasis on the law-abiding and virtuous citizen, 
and that the legislatures were granted broad authority to disarm 
“dangerous and disaffected” persons to prevent public injury, it is most 
certain that such a restriction would be deemed constitutionally 
 138. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at 
37-38. 
 139. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3057-58 (2010) (emphasis in original). 
 140. Id. at 3058 (emphasis in original). 
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permissible under the requisite low to intermediate scrutiny standard of 
review. 
III.  THE MISSING ARGUMENTS IN MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO 
Given McDonald was a divided plurality, for many years legal 
commentators will speculate as to why five Justices were at odds in 
joining one unified opinion.  Naturally, Thomas’s concurrence reveals 
that he interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause as the historical impetus for incorporation.141  
However, what is left unanswered is why Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy did not join Alito’s entire opinion.142
While we will never affirmatively know the answer to these 
questions, there is a lesson that lawyers, legal scholars, and historians 
can take from the McDonald plurality; the importance of providing 
cogent legal history arguments in litigating constitutional rights.  In the 
end, the professional historians that sided with the City of Chicago
  It 
raises questions as to whether certain historical arguments would have 
swayed a Justice to join the dissent and ultimately change the outcome 
of the case. 
143 
were both losers and winners.  They were “losers” in the sense that five 
members of the Court embraced a historical interpretation of the Second 
Amendment that is not supported by academia.144  Meanwhile, they were 
“winners” because the plurality embraced historical scholarship, albeit in 
a “historical guidepost” approach, as the judicial means to define the 
scope of the Second Amendment as its jurisprudence moves forward.145
This begets the question: “What arguments could have been made 
by the City of Chicago to alter the outcome of McDonald?”  As will be 
detailed below, two arguments stand out as missing.  The first is an 
 
 
 141. Id. at 3058-88. 
 142. Id. at 3026-50. 
 143. See Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) (supported by twenty-one scholars 
and historians); Brief for Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521);  Brief for Professional 
Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-
1521) (supported by six scholars and historians); Brief of Historians on Early American Legal, 
Constitutional and Pennsylvania History as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, McDonald,  130 
S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) (supported by four historians). 
 144. As of today, only two academic Ph.D. historians (Joyce Lee Malcolm and Robert J. 
Cottrol) support interpreting the Second Amendment in line with the Heller majority.  The 
overwhelming consensus by academic historians is to the contrary.  See supra note 143. 
 145. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
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argument addressing the importance of State Second Amendment 
analogues in determining whether the right to “keep arms” is 
incorporated to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.  At no point did the City of Chicago or its amici provide 
an analysis touching upon this issue; leaving Justice Alito to agree with 
the petitioners, writing, “[F]our States that had adopted Second 
Amendment analogues before ratification, nine more States adopted 
state constitutional provisions protecting an individual right to keep and 
bear arms between 1789 and 1820.”146
Alito also had no competing analysis addressing Second 
Amendment analogues circa 1868, leading him to believe: 
 
In 1868, 22 of 37 States in the Union had state constitutional 
provisions explicitly protecting the right to keep and bear arms . . . 
[thus] it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those 
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.147
The second argument that was missing was the use of accepted 
historical methodologies to discuss John Bingham and the 
Reconstruction Congress’s views on applying the Second Amendment to 
the States.  Scholars and historians are in general agreement that there 
were members of the Reconstruction Congress that viewed the Second 
Amendment as protecting armed, individual self-defense.  However, the 
historical evidence is not dispositive in determining the intent of the 
whole Congress, for there is competing evidence that the majority may 
have only sought to incorporate a right to “keep and bear arms” in the 
constraints of a “well-regulated militia.”
 
148  In other words, because the 
intent of the Reconstruction Congress as a whole is an issue of historical 
uncertainty and discontent, an argument should have been posed that the 
decision in Presser v. Illinois should be upheld as the intent of the 
Reconstruction Congress.149
 
 
 
 147. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3042.  By 1868, only seventeen state constitution “bear arms” 
provisions could be read to protect the right recognized in Heller.  Naturally, this is looking at the 
provision in a light most favorable to the “individual right” stance.  However, out of these seventeen 
“bear arms” provisions, eleven could just as easily be interpreted as protecting only a militia right.  
Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 459 n.740. 
 148. Id. at 456-60. 
 149. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (the Second Amendment prevents the states 
from “prohibit[ing] the people from keeping and bear arms, so as to deprive the United States of 
their rightful resource for maintaining the public security”).  A brief written by Lyman Trumbull 
gives weight to this understanding of the Second Amendment.  Representing one of the plaintiffs in 
error, Trumbull advocated for “the right of the people to keep and bear arms for the purpose of 
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A.  The “Right to Keep and Bear Arms” in State Constitutions in 1789, 
1803, and 1868: Correcting Justice Alito’s Analysis in McDonald v. City 
of Chicago 
The powers to arm, disarm, and regulate the use, possession, and 
maintaining of firearms had always been a power that resided with the 
States.  This power existed prior to the adoption of the Articles of 
Confederation, prior to the adoption of the Constitution,150 after the 
adoption of the Constitution,151
 
forming a well regulated militia . . . [as] an attribute of national citizenship, and as such, under the 
protection of, and guaranteed by the United States.”  Trumbull also wrote, “The citizen of the 
United States has secured to him the right to keep and bear arms as part of the militia which 
Congress has the right to organize, and arm, and drill into companies.”  Whether Trumbull believed 
in a non-militia “right to keep and bear arms” is less certain.  He thought the Court should not 
consider the question of whether “a State may not prohibit its citizens from keeping or bearing arms 
for other than militia purposes[.]” 
 and had never been questioned by the 
Supreme Court in the first two hundred and twenty years of existence.  
 150. For history of regulations and power to disarm, see generally Cornell, supra note 15; 
SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006); Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the 
Right to Keep Arms in Early America, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139 (2007).  See also CHARLES, THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 17-34, 83-87, 136-39; Charles, The Constitutional 
Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at 37-38 (discussing how the Continental 
Congress advised the States to pass laws disarming the disaffected); Charles, “Arms for Their 
Defence,”? supra note 15, at 386-418 (addressing the English laws concerning arms, which the 
founding fathers were familiar with); Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English 
Perspective, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY: HISTORIANS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS ON THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 207, 207–21 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000). 
 151. The early constitutional commentators differed of opinion as to whether the Second 
Amendment bound the States.  It seems that James Wilson was the first to claim the States were 
bound by its guarantee.  However, he limited its protection to the advancement of the “common 
defence.”  2 JAMES WILSON, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1141–42 (Kermit L. Hall 
& Mark David Hall eds., 2007).In 1829, William Rawle was the second to claim the Second 
Amendment bound the States as well as the federal governing, writing: 
The prohibition is general.  No clause in the Constitution could by any rule of 
construction be conceived to give to congress a power to disarm the people.  Such a 
flagitious attempt could only be made under some general pretence by a state legislature.  
But if in any blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment 
may be appealed as a restraint on both. 
RAWLE, supra note 134, at 125-26.  Many Individual Right Scholars have interpreted this statement 
as preventing the States and federal government from disarming the people outside of a “well-
regulated militia.”  See Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the 
Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983); Joyce Lee Malcolm, Arming America, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1657, 1675 (2001) (book review); Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph E. Olson, What Did “Bear 
Arms” Mean in the Second Amendment?, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 511, 519-20 (2008).However, 
this interpretation cannot survive because Rawle qualifies the right was “judiciously added” because 
“a disorderly militia is disgraceful to itself, and dangerous not to the enemy, but to its own country.”  
RAWLE, supra note 134, at 125.  See also generally Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a 
“Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15. 
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State police powers in this area were particularly understood at the time 
of the framing of the Constitution.  A fact that James Wilson took note 
of in one of his William & Mary lectures.  Wilson differentiated between 
the rights the Second Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution 
afford, writing that the Second Amendment protects citizens in 
participating in the “common defence.”152  Meanwhile, it was through 
the medium of the Pennsylvania Constitution that Wilson viewed 
citizens as having the privilege of bearing arms in defense of their 
“person or house.”153
Despite the Heller majority writing that “self-defense” was the 
“central component” of the Second Amendment,
 
154 there is virtually no 
substantiated evidence that the Framers intended for the Second 
Amendment to bind the States outside of its “well-regulated militia” 
context.  Similar to James Wilson, other contemporaneous commentary 
on the Second Amendment reveals that it was only meant to bind the 
States as preserving the “common defence.”  For instance, on October 
25, 1790, militia Lieutenant Bernard Hubley hoped that a “well 
Regulated militia corresponding with the Constitution” would be 
“adopted” throughout the nation to ensure “the best end.”155  A 1789 
letter from Fayetteville, North Carolina recognized that the “best 
security” of the right to “keep and bear arms” was “that military spirit, 
that taste for the martial exercise, which has always distinguished the 
free citizens of these States.”156  In 1801, Samuel Dana described the 
Second Amendment as being “recognized among our unalterable laws” 
and protecting the “right of bearing arms for the common defence[.]”157  
Meanwhile Anti-Federalist John Taylor described the Second 
Amendment as enshrining “a real national militia.”158
Again, prior to Heller, Supreme Court precedent supported this 
limited application of the Second Amendment to the States.  In Presser 
 
 
 152. WILSON, supra note 151, at 1141–42. 
 153. Id. at 1142. 
 154. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008).  The Heller majority was 
correct that “self-defense” or “self-preservation” was the right the Second Amendment affords.  
However, they took these terms out of their original context by misreading the 1689 Declaration of 
Rights.  See generally, supra note 15; see Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance, 
supra note 15. 
 155. 11 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 738 (Samuel Hazard ed., Philadelphia, Joseph Severns & 
Co. 1855). 
 156. THE GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia, PA), Oct. 14, 1789, at 3, col. 2. 
 157. SAMUEL DANA, AN ADDRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A WELL REGULATED MILITIA 10 
(Charleston, Samuel Etheridge, September 1801). 
 158. JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF GOVERNMENT 450 (n. 
pub. 1814). 
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v. Illinois, the Court held that the Second Amendment prevents the 
States from “prohibiting the people from keeping and bearing arms, so 
as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining 
the public security[.]”159  Meanwhile, in United States v. Schwimmer, the 
Court held that the use of arms “to defend our government against all 
enemies whether necessity arises is a fundamental principle of the 
Constitution.”160
Naturally, the McDonald plurality disagreed, but this can be 
partially attributed to the lack of a comprehensive analysis emphasizing 
the right to “keep arms” through State Second Amendment analogues.
  Herein lies the protection the Second Amendment was 
meant to apply to the States—United States citizens have the right to 
take part in defending their liberties through a “well-regulated militia.” 
161  
Not one of the briefs in support of the City of Chicago distinguished the 
different State Second Amendment analogues and their importance or 
applicability to incorporating the right to “keep arms.  For instance, 
looking at the state provisions as codified circa 1789, Justice Alito writes 
that “four States . . . adopted Second Amendment analogues before 
ratification” that protected “an individual right to keep and bear 
arms[.]”162  Alito’s characterization of 1789 is flat wrong in two 
respects.  First, only two states’ “bear arms” provisions could be read to 
protect a right to armed, individual self-defense of a person.163  Second, 
only one state’s “bear arms” provision protects the right to “keep 
arms.”164
Alito was correct that four state constitutions contained Second 
Amendment analogues, including Massachusetts,
 
165 Pennsylvania,166
 
 159. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). 
 
 160. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S 644, 650 (1929). 
 161. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3109 (2010). (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing the legal issue as “Petitioners wish to acquire certain types of firearms, or to keep 
certain possession of chattels”). 
 162. Id. at 3037.  Justice Alito cites the Heller opinion to support this conclusion.  However, 
the Heller majority’s understanding of these earlier constitutional provisions had been refuted.  See 
CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 131-32. 
 163. PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. XIII (“That the right of citizens to bear arms for the defence of 
themselves and the State.”); VT. CONST. OF 1786, art. XVIII (“That the people have a right to bear 
arms, for defence of themselves and the State.”).  The Supreme Court did not provide individual 
analysis on these provisions, which could be interpreted as protecting the limited militia right.  See 
CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 131-32; Charles, The Right of Self-
Preservation and Resistance, supra note 15, at 29 (discussing that “defence of themselves” was 
often used to describe defending the realm or restoring the Constitution). 
 164. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XVII (“The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the 
common defence.”). 
 165. Id. 
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North Carolina,167 and Vermont.168  However, only the 1780 
Massachusetts Constitution protected a right to “keep arms” which was 
expressly limited to the “common defence.”169  This limited 
interpretation of the Massachusetts protection was confirmed in the 
wake of Shays’ Rebellion.  The Massachusetts Legislature and Governor 
James Bowdoin clarified that the “right to keep and bear arms” was 
included in the Massachusetts Constitution because it was “necessary for 
the safety of the state” in order “to support the civil government and 
oppose attempts of factitious and wicked men who may wish to subvert 
the laws and constitution of their country.”170
At no point was there a reference to the right protecting the 
“keeping” of arms for any and all purposes, including armed, individual 
self-defense.  In fact, the Shays’ insurgents that refused to submit to the 
Massachusetts government had their arms seized with no mention of a 
right to arms being violated by them, any of the prominent founders, or 
the contemporaneous popular print culture.
 
171  While one may argue that 
participating in armed rebellion would clearly warrant disarmament, 
even at the founding period, this does not explain why much to do was 
made of the fact that the insurgents were being denied the right to vote.  
For instance, George Washington and Benjamin Lincoln could not see 
“how, upon republican principles . . . can we justly exclude them from 
the right of Governing.”172  Meanwhile James Madison was of the 
opinion that such political exclusion brought on a “new crisis” because it 
“disenfranchised a considerable portion of disaffected voters.”173
Indeed, this raises a very important question: “Was the right to vote 
and participate in government viewed as superior to the right to “keep 
and bear arms for the common defence”?”  The answer is no.  Both the 
right to “keep and bear arms” and a right to vote were codified in the 
 
 
 166. PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. XIII (“That the right of citizens to bear arms for the defence of 
themselves and the State”). 
 167. N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XVII (“That the people have a right to bear arms, for the 
defence of the State.”). 
 168. VT. CONST. OF 1786, art. XVIII (“That the people have a right to bear arms, for defence of 
themselves and the State.”). 
 169. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XVII. 
 170. AN ACT FOR THE MORE SPEEDY AND EFFECTUAL SUPPRESSION OF TUMULTS AND 
INSURRECTIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH (Mass. 1787). 
 171. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 84-87. 
 172. 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 433 (Philander D. 
Chase ed., 1995). 
 173. 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 286, 307 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1975).  See also id. at 315, 
343, 395-96, 399. 
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1780 Massachusetts Constitution.174  The only difference between the 
two provisions is that the right to “keep and bear arms” was expressly 
limited to the “common defence.”  This limited interpretation of the right 
to “keep arms” is supported by the use of the phrase in contemporaneous 
militia laws and military treatises.175  Commentators seem to forget that 
the Heller majority held that “keep arms” was a phrase that was “not 
prevalent in the written documents of the founding period that we have 
found.”176
In other words, the Heller majority did not examine the phrase in 
contemporaneous laws and literature.  This interpretational farce could 
have been significant in McDonald because the City of Chicago and its 
amici could have more thoroughly
 
177 illuminated that the phrase was 
consistently used in state laws to describe the maintaining of military 
arms for militia service.  For instance, in Delaware’s 1782 Militia Act it 
required every enrolled militiaman to “keep the [same] arms by him at 
all times, ready and fit for Service” or pay a fine of twenty shillings.178  
In Maryland’s 1799 Militia Act it restricted the “keeping” of arms when 
it provided if “any private or non commissioned officer, to whom a 
musket is delivered, shall use the same in hunting, gunning or fowling or 
shall not keep his arms . . . in neat and clean order . . . shall forfeit” a 
fine.179  Meanwhile, Virginia’s 1784 militia law required the slave 
patrols to “constantly keep the aforesaid arms, accoutrements, and 
ammunition ready.”180
Furthermore, the fact that the right to “keep arms” circa 1789 only 
appears in the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution for the “common 
defence” illuminates the argument that the States have always had a 
compelling interest in determining who owns or possesses arms, outside 
the “well-regulated militia” context, in the interest of public safety, and 
therefore the Heller right should not have been applied to the States.  
This interpretation is even supported by the history of the 1792 National 
 
 
 174. See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, CHAP. I, § 2, art. II. 
 175. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 22-30. 
 176. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2792 (2008). 
 177. To my knowledge only the English Historians’ brief addressed this fact.  See Brief for 
English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 143, at 38-
39. 
 178. AN ACT FOR ESTABLISHING A MILITIA WITHIN THIS STATE, § 6 (Del. 1782). 
 179. A SUPPLEMENT TO THE ACT ENTITLED, ‘AN ACT TO REGULATE AND DISCIPLINE THE 
MILITIA OF THIS STATE, § 30 (Md. 1799). 
 180. 11 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 478-79 (William Hening ed., Richmond, George 
Cochran 1823). 
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Militia Act.181  Congress intentionally left to the States the authority to 
enforce the Act’s arming provisions,182 which reveals that the federal 
government had no intention of impeding the States’ authority to 
regulate the “keeping” or maintaining of arms.183
Lastly, the fact that five state constitutions (compared to only four 
“bear arms” provisions) protected a right to a “well-regulated militia”
 
184 
could have been used to support this argument—i.e., that the right to 
“keep arms” should only apply to the States in the limited context 
recognized in Presser and Schwimmer.  As addressed above, Justice 
Alito claimed that four states circa 1789 “adopted Second Amendment 
analogues” protecting the Heller right,185 but a general reading does not 
support that either the Massachusetts or North Carolina constitutions 
protected such a right.186  Certainly, Pennsylvania and Vermont’s 
constitutional guarantees could be read in a light that supports Heller.187  
However, these guarantees make no mention of a right to “keep arms.”  
Thus, there is a strong constitutional presumption that the founding 
fathers viewed individualized arms ownership as akin to the 
Pennsylvania Minority dissent, which permitted the disarming of people 
“for crimes committed” or when the legislatures thought there would be 
a “real danger of public injury from individuals[.]”188
 
 181. 1 U.S. STAT. 271 (1792). 
 
 182. For a history, see CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 71-79, 139-53. 
 183. Id. at 139-53.  This includes the state keeping the arms and only distributing them during 
times of muster.  Id. at 31-34.  This practice was consistent with their English forefathers, see 4 & 5 
Phil. & Mary. c. 2, § 5 (1557-8) (Eng.) (the arms of cities, boroughs, towns, parishes, and hamlets 
shall “be kepte in suche Place as by the sayd Commissioners shalbe appointed”); 30 Geo. 2, c. 25 
(1757) (Eng.). 
 184. MD. CONST. of 1776 art. XXV (“That a well-regulated militia is the proper and natural 
defence of a free government.”); N.H. CONST. of 1784 art. XXIV (“A well regulated militia is the 
proper, natural, and sure defence of a state.”); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL 
RULES art. XVIII (Del. 1776) (“That a well regulated Militia is the proper, natural and safe Defense 
of a free government.”); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XIII (Va. 1776) (“That a well regulated 
militia, composed of the body of people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a 
free State.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XL (“And whereas it is of the utmost importance to the 
safety of every State that it should always be in a condition of defence; and it is the duty of every 
man who enjoys the protection of society to be prepared and willing to defend it; this convention 
therefore, in the name and by the authority of the good people of this State, doth ordain, determine, 
and declare that the militia of this State, at all times hereafter, as well in peace as in war, shall be 
armed and disciplined, and in readiness for service.”). 
 185. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037 (2010). 
 186. See supra note 167, 169 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra note 166, 168. 
 188. THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF THE 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (Dec. 17, 1787). 
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This status quo did not change with the addition of the States of 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio.  All three constitutions would include a 
“bear arms” provision,189 but only the Tennessee Constitution included a 
right to “keep arms.”  Similar to Massachusetts, this right only extended 
to the keeping and bearing of arms for the “common defence.”  Thus, by 
1803, out of seventeen State constitutions the Second Amendment 
analogues could be categorized as follows in Chart I (“State Second 
Amendment Analogues Circa 1803”).190
Of course, Justice Alito did not distinguish the Second Amendment 
analogues in this fashion because it was never brought to the Court’s 
attention.  Instead, Alito reiterated the Heller majority’s classification of 
armed, individual self-defense in the home as the “palladium of 
liberty”
 
191—a characterization that does not comport with the founders’ 
understanding of the Second Amendment.192  “Arms” by themselves 
were not the “palladium of liberty” to which St. George Tucker and 
Joseph Story referred.193
 
  It was the Second Amendment’s “well 
regulated militia” that the founding generation repetitively described as 
the “palladium of liberty,” for it encompassed an ancient constitutional  
 
 189. OHIO CONST. of 1802 art. VIII, § 20 (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the 
defense of themselves and the state: and as standing armies in time of peace, are dangerous to 
liberty, they shall not be kept up; and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to the 
civil power.”); KY. CONST. of 1799 art. X, § 23 (“That the rights of the citizens to bear arms in 
defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”); TENN. CONST. of 1796 art. XI, § 26 
(“That the freemen of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defence.”). 
 190. This is interpreting the respective state constitutions in a light most favorable to the right 
recognized in Heller.  However, there is sufficient evidence available to interpret these provisions as 
being limited to a militia right.  See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 132-34.  
Even if one takes the State Second Amendment analogues circa 1820, only Mississippi’s protects a 
right to “keep arms” for personal self-defense.  MISS. CONST. of 1817 art. I, § 23 (“The right of 
every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in the aid of the 
civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called into question, but the legislature 
may regulate or forbid the carrying of concealed weapons.”).  Indiana and Alabama’s analogues 
were limited to “bear arms.”  IND. CONST. of 1816 art. I, § 20 (“That the people have a right to bear 
arms for the defence of themselves and the state.”); ALA. CONST. of 1819 art. I, § 23 (“Every citizen 
has a right to bear arms in defence of himself and the State.”).  Louisiana’s analogue only protected 
a militia right.  LA. CONST. of 1812 art.III, § 22 (“The free white men of this State, shall be armed 
and disciplined for its defence”).  The Illinois Constitution circa 1820 did not contain a Second 
Amendment analogue. 
 191. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2805 (2008). 
 192. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 420-21; CHARLES, THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 50.  See also generally Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker 
and the Second Amendment: Original Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1123 (2006). 
 193. See TUCKER, supra note 132, at 238; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1001 ((Boston, C.C. Little & J. Brown 1833). 
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CHART I: STATE SECOND AMENDMENT ANALOGUES CIRCA 1803 
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Connecticut* 
              
Delaware (1776)    X    
Georgia (1798)        
Kentucky (1799) X X      
Maryland (1776)    X    
Massachusetts (1780) X  X  X  X 
New Hampshire (1784)    X    
New Jersey (1776)        
New York (1777)    X    
North Carolina (1776) X  X     
Ohio (1802) X X      
Pennsylvania (1790) X X      
Rhode Island*        
South Carolina (1778)        
Tennessee (1796) X  X  X  X 
Vermont (1793) X X      
Virginia (1776)    X    
Totals 7 4 3 5 2 0 2 
Percentile 41.20% 23.50% 17.60% 29.40% 11.80% 0.00% 11.80% 
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balance consistent with the republican ideals of the Roman, Florentine, 
and the English Constitutions.194
This understanding of a “well-regulated militia” as the “palladium 
of liberty” was frequently conveyed in the popular print culture.  For 
example, a July 1789 edition of The New-York Packet discussed how a 
“well regulated Militia” requires the “habitual exercise” of military 
training and “manly discipline, which is the bulwark of the country[.]”
 
195  
This knowledge of the military art was the “sole means to render a 
standing army useless” and to “form a truly warlike militia.”196  It was 
not “arms” in itself that secured the nation.  It was the maintenance of 
knowledge in the military art, for “education is a bulwark against 
tyranny, it is the grand palladium of true liberty in a republican 
government.”197  James Simmons similarly described the “militia of 
America” as the “palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort 
in case of hostility.”198  Isaac Crane wrote that the national assemblage 
of the militia was the “grand palladium of our liberties[.]”199  
Meanwhile, a 1798 militia address published in the Connecticut Gazette 
stated, “The importance and practicability of a well regulated and 
disciplined Militia, in a free country, cannot be doubted, this day you 
have evinced that such a thing is altogether practicable—You are the 
palladium of which your country leans for the protection against all 
foreign invasion[.]”200
Therefore, given that there were (a) more “well-regulated militia” 
analogues than Heller right analogues, (b) not one Heller right analogue 
protected a right to “keep arms,” and that (c) St. George Tucker and 
Joseph Story were referring to the militia as a “palladium of liberty,” it 
makes little sense for Alito to claim that the Second Amendment 
analogues protected “an individual right to keep and bear arms” that 
“legal commentators confirmed the importance of[.]”
 
201
 
 194. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at 
12-13, 21-22, 52-53. 
  If anything, the 
Second Amendment analogues contemporaneous with the Constitution 
reveal that the States had varying views on the right to “bear arms,” with 
the majority supporting a right to a “well-regulated militia,” to “bear 
 195. THE NEW-YORK PACKET (New York, NY), July 25, 1789, at 2 col. 4. 
 196. Id. at 3, col. 1. 
 197. Id. 
 198. JAMES SIMMONS, A MILITARY ESSAY 12 (Charleston, Markland & M’lver 1793). 
 199. ISAAC WATTS CRANE, AN ORATION DELIVERED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, AT 
ELIZABETH-TOWN, ON THE FOURTH OF JULY, 1794, at 15 (Newark, Woods 1795). 
 200. AMERICAN MERCURY (Hartford, CT), Nov. 1, 1798, pg. 2 col. 3. 
 201. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037 (2010). 
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arms” for the “common defence” of the State, and the right to “keep 
arms” outside of this context was a matter of state control. 
This still leaves the state constitutions as codified at the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.  Justice Alito writes, “22 of 37 
States in the Union had state constitutional provisions explicitly 
protecting the right to keep and bear arms,” making it “clear that the 
Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to 
keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our 
system of ordered liberty.”202  Here again, Alito’s statement needs to be 
qualified because the evidence is not as clear and convincing as he was 
led to believe in an amicus brief submitted by thirty-seven State 
Attorneys General.203
 As shown in Chart II (“State Second Amendment Analogues Circa 
1868”) only seventeen state analogues can be interpreted to protect the 
right recognized in Heller;
 
204
 
 202. Id. at 3042. 
 less than half of the State constitutions 
circa 1868.  Most importantly, out of these seventeen Heller right 
analogues only five protected a right to “keep arms” – the legal question 
at issue in  
 203. See Brief for Texas and Thirty-Seven Other States as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, at 15-16, McDonald, 130 S. Ct 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). 
 204. ALA. CONST. of 1867 art. I, § 28; CONN. CONST. of 1818 art. I, § 17; FLA. CONST. of 1868 
art. I, § 22; GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14; IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 32; KAN. CONST. of 1859, 
BILL OF RIGHTS, § 4; KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 25; MICH. CONST. of 1850 art. XVIII, § 7; 
MISS. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 15; MO. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 24; 
OHIO CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 4; OR. CONST. of 1857 art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. of 1838 art. IX, § 21; 
R.I. CONST. of 1842 art I, § 22; TEX. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 13; VT. CONST. of 1793 ch. I, art. 
XVI.  This is looking at each state’s constitution in a light most favorable to the “individual right” 
stance.  However, out of these seventeen states, arguably eleven of these “bear arms” provisions 
could be interpreted as merely a militia right.  See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 
15, at 132-34 (discussing how the Courts should determine whether a state provision is a militia or 
individual self-defense right); FLA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 22 (“[R]ight to bear arms in defence of 
themselves and the lawful authority of the State.”); GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14 (“[R]ight of the 
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 32 (“[R]ight to 
bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”); § 4; KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 25 
(“[R]ight of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be 
questioned.”); MO. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 8 (“[R]ight to bear arms in defence of themselves and of 
the lawful authority of the State cannot be questioned.”); N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 24 (“[R]ight 
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); OHIO CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 4 
(“[P]eople have the right to bear arms for their defense and security.”); OR. CONST. of 1857 art. I, § 
27 (“[P]eople shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”); PA. 
CONST. of 1838 art. IX, § 21 (“[R]ight of the citizens to bear arms, in defence of themselves and the 
State, shall not be questioned.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842 art. I, § 22 (“[R]ight of the people to keep and 
bear arms shall not be infringed.”); VT. CONST. of 1793 ch. I, art. XVI. (“[P]eople have a right to 
bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”).    
CHARLES_MACROED_FINAL_EDITOR.DOCX 2/7/20112:57 PM 
2010] THE SECOND AMENDMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW AFTER MCDONALD 51 
CHART II: 
STATE SECOND AMENDMENT ANALOGUES CIRCA 1868 
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Alabama (1867) X X           
Arkansas (1868) X   X   X   X 
California (1849)               
Connecticut (1818) X X           
Delaware (1831)               
Florida (1868) X X           
Georgia (1868)* X X   X X X   
Illinois (1848)               
Indiana (1851) X X           
Iowa (1857)               
Kansas (1859) X X           
Kentucky (1850) X X           
Louisiana (1868)               
Maine (1820) X   X   X   X 
Maryland (1867)       X       
Massachusetts (1780) X   X   X   X 
Michigan (1850) X X           
Minnesota (1857)               
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Mississippi (1868) X X     X X   
Missouri (1865) X X           
Nebraska (1866)               
Nevada (1864)               
New Hampshire (1792)       X       
New Jersey (1844)               
New York (1846)               
North Carolina (1868)* X X   X X X   
Ohio (1851) X X           
Oregon (1857) X X           
Pennsylvania (1838) X X           
Rhode Island (1842) X X     X X   
South Carolina (1868) X   X   X   X 
Tennessee (1834) X   X   X   X 
Texas (1868) X X     X X   
Vermont (1793) X X           
Virginia (1864)       X       
West Virginia (1863)               
Wisconsin (1848)               
Totals 22 17 5 5 10 5 5 
Percentile 59.50% 45.90% 13.50% 13.50% 27.00% 13.50% 13.50% 
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McDonald.205  At the same time, however, five state constitutions 
expressly limited the “right to keep and bear arms” to the “common 
defence.”206
 It is nonsensical to incorporate a right to “keep arms” for armed self 
defense of the home and classify it as “fundamental to a scheme of 
ordered liberty” when only five State analogues circa 1868 protected 
such a right.  If anything, the fact that five State analogues limited the 
right to “keep arms” for the “common defence,” coupled with the fact 
that a total of thirty-two States did not protect a right to “keep arms” for 
personal self-defense presents a strong constitutional presumption that 
that the “keeping” of arms is a power reserved to the States. 
 
Despite the availability of these state analogue statistics, no one 
sought to analyze them to counter the claims of gun right advocates’, 
Individual Right Scholars’, and the McDonald petitioners’ improper 
equation of a right to “keep arms” with other fundamental rights circa 
1868.  As seen in comparing Chart II to Chart III (“State Constitutional 
Analogues Circa 1868”), a right to “keep arms” for personal self-defense 
was in no way equal to other fundamental rights of the era such as 
freedom of speech and religion, due process, right to a fair jury trial for 
alleged crimes committed, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual 
punishment, and unlawful searches and seizures.  Excluding double 
jeopardy (eighty-third percentile), these fundamental rights are within 
the eighty-sixth percentile.  Furthermore, the fact that unincorporated 
rights such as the quartering of troops, excessive bail, and the grand jury 
clause substantially exceed the right to “keep arms,” the Heller decision 
does not favor incorporation.  Even taking Alito’s characterization of the 
Second Amendment analogues as true, the “right to keep and bear arms” 
circa 1868 falls within the realm of the unincorporated rights of  
 
 205. GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14 (“A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security 
of a free people, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); MISS. 
CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 15 (“All persons shall have a right to keep and bear arms for their 
defence.”); N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 24 (“A well-regulated militia being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); R.I. 
CONST. of 1842 art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); 
TEX. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 13 (“Every person shall have the right to keep and bear arms, in the 
lawful defence of himself or the State.”). 
 206. ARK. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 5 (“The citizens of this State shall have the right to keep and 
bear arms for their common defence.”); ME. CONST. of 1820 art. I, § 16 (“Every citizen has the right 
to keep and bear arms for their common defence.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. XVII (“The people 
have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence.”); S.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 28 
(“The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence.”); TENN. CONST. of 1834 
art. I, § 26 (“That the free white men of this State have a right to Keep and to bear arms for their 
common defence.”). 
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CHART III:  STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALOGUES CIRCA 1868 
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States Incorporated Rights Through the Fourteenth Amendment Unincorporated Rights 
Alabama (1867) X X X X X X X X X 
Arkansas (1868) X X X X X X   X X 
California (1849) X X X X X X   X X 
Connecticut (1818) X X   X X   X X X 
Delaware (1831)* X X X X X X X X X 
Florida (1868) X X X X X X X X X 
Georgia (1868) X X X X X X   X   
Illinois (1848) X X   X X X X X X 
Indiana (1851) X X X X X X X X   
Iowa (1857) X X X X X X X X X 
Kansas (1859) X X X X X X X X   
Kentucky (1850) X X X X X X X X X 
Louisiana (1868) X X X X X X   X   
Maine (1820) X X X X X X X X X 
Maryland (1867) X X X X X   X X   
Massachusetts (1780) X X X X X   X X   
Michigan (1850) X X   X X   X     
Minnesota (1857) X X X X X X   X X 
Mississippi (1868) X X X X X X   X X 
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States Incorporated Rights Through the Fourteenth Amendment Unincorporated Rights 
Missouri (1865) X X X X X X X X   
Nebraska (1866) X X X X X X   X X 
Nevada (1864) X X X X X X X X X 
New Hampshire (1792) X X X X X X X X   
New Jersey (1844) X X X X X X X X X 
New York (1846) X X X X   X   X   
North Carolina (1868)+A11 X X X X X   X X X 
Ohio (1851) X X X X X X X X X 
Oregon (1857) X X X X X X X X   
Pennsylvania (1838) X X X X X X X X   
Rhode Island (1842) X X X X X X X X X 
South Carolina (1868) X X X X X X X X X 
Tennessee (1834) X X X X X X X X   
Texas (1868) X X X X X X   X   
Vermont (1793) X X   X X X   X   
Virginia (1864) X X X   X     X   
West Virginia (1863) X X X X X X   X   
Wisconsin (1848) X X   X X X   X X 
Totals 37 37 32 36 36 31 24 36 20 
Percentile 100.00% 100.00% 86.50% 97.30% 97.30% 83.80% 64.90% 97.30% 54.10% 
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quartering troops and grand jury clause (fifty-ninth percentile).  Perhaps 
what is most striking is that the Heller right analogues fall significantly 
short of all unincorporated rights at less than half of all State 
constitutions circa 1868 (forty-fifth percentile)—a fact that makes it hard 
to classify the Heller right as fundamental to an ordered scheme of 
liberty. 
To paraphrase, a detailed analysis of the Second Amendment 
analogues circa 1789, 1803, and 1868 may have prevented incorporation 
in McDonald because what constituted the “right to keep and bear arms” 
substantially varied throughout the United States.  Of particular 
importance is that the right to “keep arms” for individual purposes was 
nonexistent in 1789 state constitutions, and in only five of thirty-seven 
state constitutions circa 1868.  Even under a “living constitution” 
argument, the Second Amendment analogue argument fails, for only 
twenty-eight of fifty states have “keep arms” analogues that can be 
interpreted as protecting individual self-defense—a measly 56% of all 
state constitutions.207  Thus, there is a strong argument that the right to 
“keep arms” should be viewed as unique and distinct from the other 
protections in the Bill of Rights.  It was a right that has always affected 
the safety of the whole community, and has been viewed as intimately 
connected with the police power of the State.208
Despite McDonald incorporating the Second Amendment to the 
States, perhaps this evidence can still be useful in future courts 
examining the constitutionality of gun control laws.  The evidence is 
clear and convincing that the States have always had a compelling 
interest in regulating the “keeping” of arms to protect the community.  
The absence of “keep arms” in “individual right” Second Amendment 
analogues circa 1789 and 1803, coupled with their limited use in 1868 
constitutions (5 of 37 States), drives this point home.  Thus, should the 
courts ever decide to give greater deference to the States regulating the 
“keeping” of arms than that of “bearing” arms,” it would comport with 
the historical guidepost approach, for such regulations would fall within 
traditional norms. 
 
 
 
 
 207. This count in based on a compilation of state “bear arms” analogues by Eugene Volokh.  
See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions, 11 TEX. REV. L. 
& POL. 191 (2006). 
 208. RAWLE, supra note134, at 125 (an armed nation is “dangerous not to the enemy, but to its 
own country”). 
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B. John Bingham’s Second Amendment?:  Competing History and 
Reexamining the “Privilege” to “Bear Arms” and Incorporation 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause 
In a concurring opinion Justice Thomas described the process of 
selective incorporation as a “legal fiction” and a “dangerous one” at 
that.209  Instead of focusing on whether a right was essential to the 
American “scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition,” Thomas felt incorporation should be reexamined 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause 
“consistent with public understanding at the time of its ratification.”210
In a way, Thomas’s concurrence was the opinion that the City of 
Chicago did not attempt to sway by providing the competing concerns of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers.  It was well known that Thomas 
had expressed a desire to reexamine the history of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause should the appropriate case arise.
 
211
Under the “historically focused” approach . . . numerous threshold 
questions arise before one ever gets to the history.  At what level of 
generality should one frame the liberty interest in question?  What does 
it mean for a right to be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition”?  By what standards will that proposition be tested?  Which 
types of sources will count, and how will those sources be weighed and 
aggregated? . . . It is hardly a novel insight that history is not an 
objective science, and that its use can therefore “point in any direction 
the judges favor.”
  Perhaps if the 
City of Chicago had brought forth an argument using accepted historical 
methodologies to show the competing evidence, Justice Stevens’ 
concerns—touching upon the use of history to define incorporation of 
rights to the States—would have been given more weight.  Stevens 
queried: 
212
To paraphrase, Stevens was arguing that history alone should not 
sway the Court’s determination, for it can produce competing results.  
This holds especially true when trying to calculate the “public” or 
“popular understanding” of how the Second Amendment was intended 
to apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Certainly, the 
City of Chicago presented historical arguments that the Second 
 
 
 209. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3062 (2010). 
 210. Id. at 3062. 
 211. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 212. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3116-17. 
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Amendment should not be incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.213  Their argument was 
two-fold.  First, the City of Chicago argued that 1868 “public 
understanding” does not support incorporation of the entire Bill of 
Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.214  Second, it was argued that congressional concerns about 
discriminatory disarmament is insufficient to show “public 
understanding” of the Second Amendment being incorporated.215
Both of these arguments were useful in illustrating that there is 
some academic disagreement regarding the meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.
 
216  However, what the City of Chicago did not 
consider was challenging whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers 
could constitutionally alter the founding fathers’ interpretation of the 
Second Amendment and its intended application to the States.217  Akhil 
Amar and many followers have sold legal academia on the notion that 
John Bingham and the Reconstruction Congress sought to unequivocally 
alter the founders’ view of a national “well-regulated militia” right,218 
and apply a right to bear arms for personal self-defense to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.219
 
 213. The City of Chicago dedicated forty-six pages of their brief to this argument.  See Brief of 
Respondent City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park, at 54-79, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) 
(No. 08-1521). 
  It is asserted that the threat of the Ku Klux Klan, increased 
 214. Id. at 54-74. 
 215. Id. at 75-79. 
 216. For scholarship supporting the City of Chicago’s view, see James E. Bond, The Original 
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. 
REV. 435 (1985); Carole Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun Rights, and Gun 
Regulation in the Reconstruction South, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 615 (2006); Lambert Gingras, 
Congressional Misunderstandings and the Ratifiers’ Understanding: The Case of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 41 (1996); Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets 
the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. 
CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 361 (2009); George C. Thomas III, Newspapers and the Fourteenth 
Amendment: What Did the American Public Know About Section 1?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
323 (2009). 
 217. There is sufficient historical evidence supporting that the founding fathers viewed the 
Second Amendment as requiring the maintenance of a constitutional “well-regulated militia” or an 
individual right to protect the “common defence.”  See generally Charles, The Constitutional 
Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15.  See also discussion on James Wilson 
supra note 151, at 1141-42. 
 218. Amar admits that the founding fathers had a “well-regulated militia” right in mind when 
drafting the Second Amendment.  See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 50-59 (1998). 
 219. Amar believes the Reconstruction Congress could alter the Second Amendment as it was 
originally understood by the framers to a right of armed, individual self-defense of the home 
without altering the text of the Second Amendment itself.  Id. at 258-65.  There is a multitude of 
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Southern violence towards Freedmen, and Black Crow laws concerning 
firearms compelled the Reconstruction Congress to ensure the “right to 
keep and bear arms” extended to all citizens, white and black.220
Assuming the historical conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was drafted to apply the Bill of Rights to the States,
 
221 Amar’s assertion 
needs to be qualified using accepted historical methodologies.222  There 
is no denying that there were members of the Reconstruction Congress 
that viewed the Second Amendment as protecting armed, individual self-
defense of one’s person, property, and family.223  However, in many 
instances that the “right to keep and bear arms” was stated in speeches, it 
was only done in passing when listing the Bill of Rights.224
 
scholarship supporting that the Reconstruction Congress viewed the Second Amendment as 
affirmatively protecting against private violence, but it primarily stems from the work of Stephen P. 
Halbrook.  See generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 
AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-76 (1998) [hereinafter FREEDMEN AND THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT]; STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED].  See also Kopel, 
supra note 96.  For an “individual right” popular understanding analysis, see Clayton Cramer, et al., 
This Right is Not Allowed by Governments That Are Afraid of the People, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
823 (2010). 
  In these 
 220. See supra note 219. 
 221. For some of the prominent scholarship supporting this view, see Richard L. Aynes, Ink 
Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295 (2009) 
[hereinafter Ink Blot or Not]; Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: The 
History and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77 (2009) [hereinafter Enforcing the Bill of 
Rights Against the States]; Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview 
from One Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2009) [hereinafter The Bill of Rights and 
the States]; Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper’s Book, The Impending 
Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113 (1993 [hereinafter The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper’s 
Book]; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1990) [hereinafter NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE]. 
 222. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”? supra note 15, at 458. 
 223. According to my research, there are only four instances in the Congressional Globe circa 
1866 that definitively speak to members of Congress supporting the stance that the Second 
Amendment protects the having and using arms for personal self-defense.  See 39 CONG. GLOBE, 
FIRST SESSION 1073 (1866) (Mr. Nye stated, “As citizens of the United States [Freedmen] have 
equal right to protection, and to keep and bear arms for self-defense.”); id. at 1182 (Mr. Pomeroy 
stated Freedmen “should have the right to bear arms for the defense of himself and family and his 
homestead.”); id. at 371 (Mr. Davis stated the founding fathers “were for every man bearing his 
arms about him and keeping them in his house, his castle, for his own defense.”); id. at 1838. 
 224. There are numerous instances of this during Reconstruction, but for some examples see id. 
at 1629; (Mr. Hart listed “the privileges and immunities of other citizens” as: “‘no law shall be made 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion; ‘where ‘the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall 
not be infringed; ‘where ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses . . . ’”); id. at 
2765 (Senator Howard stated the “privileges and immunities” include “the freedom of speech and 
the press; the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of 
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instances, no indication was given as to whether it was in reference to an 
individual militia right or a right to repel burglars.  There was no 
context, thus each member of Congress could have taken their own 
interpretation as to what encompassed the “right to bear arms.” 
Furthermore, the fact that the Second Amendment was debated 
intensively when Congress sought to disarm unlawful Southern militias 
supports the historical interpretation that members of Congress had 
differing interpretations as to what “right to bear arms” in these general 
speeches inferred.225
The historical point is that it is inconclusive as to whether the entire 
Congress viewed the Second Amendment as applying to the States in the 
manner Justice Thomas conveyed.
  Perhaps most importantly, and what this article 
sets forth to illuminate, is that there is a significant amount of evidence 
to suggest that members of Congress only intended to incorporate the 
Second Amendment as to preserve the founders’ intent, i.e., a national 
militia where “the people” would equally participate in “bearing arms” 
for the defense of the community and nation.  Meanwhile any rights 
pertaining to the use of “arms” for other purposes would have been 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
226  Just as some may have viewed it 
as a right to repel private violence, others would have viewed it as purely 
a militia right.  Again, this article does not seek to challenge that there 
were members of Congress and the public circa 1868 who viewed the 
Second Amendment as protecting against individual violence.227
Support for a more limited application of the Second Amendment 
to the States is supported by an 1871 speech delivered by John Bingham 
at Belpre, Ohio.  Bingham detailed how he saw the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause applied the Bill of Rights 
to the States: 
  What it 
does set forth to dispose is that Justice Thomas’ interpretation—of the 
Second Amendment applying to the States through the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause circa 1868—is not dispositive of the entire Congress 
or the people as a whole, for the historical evidence does not provide an 
unequivocal answer. 
Under the Constitution as it was, no State of this Union ever had the 
right to make or enforce any law which abridged the privileges or 
immunities of the citizens of the United States, as guaranteed by the 
 
grievances . . . the right to keep and bear arms; the right to be exempted from the quartering of 
soldiers . . . ”). 
 225. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 457 n.733. 
 226. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058-88 (2010). 
 227. For some scholarship examining this view, see supra note 219. 
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Constitution of the United States.  Yet in nearly half the States of the 
Union these privileges and immunities of the citizen were abridged by 
the State legislation and State administration.  The freedom of speech 
was abridged, the freedom of the press was abridged, the freedom of 
conscience was abridged, the right of the people to peaceably assemble 
was abridged, the equal right of the citizen to vote at all elections was 
abridged, and finally, the right to bear arms for the Union and the 
Constitution was abridged and prohibited by States laws[.]228
Of particular interest is how Bingham understood the Second 
Amendment as applying to the States.  Notice that he makes no mention 
of a right to “bear arms” for personal or private interests.  Bingham only 
makes mention of the fact that state legislatures prevented Freedmen 
from “the right to bear arms” in defense of “the Union and the 
Constitution[.]”
 
229
Perhaps what makes Bingham’s speech of great significance, in 
support of this argument, is his personal involvement in drafting the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In fact, one may argue that Bingham’s 
interpretation should be the only interpretation that the courts should 
follow in conducting a “popular understanding” analysis.
  Was this done intentionally?  Did Bingham only seek 
to apply a militia right to the States via the Second Amendment?  The 
evidence is debatable.  However, if we take Bingham’s 1871 speech 
verbatim there is an argument to be made that the Second Amendment 
had limited application to the States. 
230
To begin, it is often forgotten that blacks were excluded from most 
state militias and even from the Union Army until the creation of the 
infamous 54th Massachusetts Regiment.  It did not matter that thousands 
of blacks, free and slave, had fought valiantly in the American 
  This begets 
the question: “What was Bingham explicitly referring to, and why did he 
not include bearing arms for personal self-defense?” 
 
 228. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE (Cincinnati, OH), Sept. 15, 1871, at 2, col. 4. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589, 591 (2003) [hereinafter The Continuing Importance 
of Congressman John A. Bingham] (“Bingham’s inseparable link with the Amendment makes him 
worthy of attention from both a legal and an historical view . . . his words may provide meaning or 
context for what has been termed original intent, meaning or understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
103 YALE L.J. 57, 103 (1993) [hereinafter On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth 
Amendment] (discussing the importance of Bingham’s views on contemporaries and the first federal 
courts to apply the Fourteenth Amendment).  Justice Thomas’s concurrence also found Bingham’s 
view to be “particularly significant as “the principal draftsman of §1[.]”  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 
3072. 
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Revolution.231  This military service had gone forgotten in the pantheons 
of history until Civil War abolitionists sought the participation of black 
troops.  Despite the urging of prominent abolitionists such as Frederick 
Douglas, the Lincoln administration refused to enlist blacks because they 
“had never shown any ability in the nation’s history.”232  Thus, to urge 
Abraham Lincoln to enlist an all black regiment, a history was compiled 
by a librarian and historian named George Moore.233  Entitled Historical 
Notes on the Employment of Negroes in the American Revolution, Moore 
sought to “set the record straight” by highlighting the valiant service of 
the all black First Rhode Island Regiment as well as other instances of 
blacks participating in the achievement of American independence.234
By the end of the Civil War, over 200,000 black soldiers had taken 
up arms in defense of the Union, mostly slaves from the South.  In 
reward of their service, Congress offered them the purchase of their 
service rifle, believing that many of these men would be called upon 
again to secure peace and order in a national or state run militia.  
However, Congress did not account for the fact that many Southern 
militia laws forbade blacks from serving and disarmed the very veterans 
they had provided arms.  Congressman Clarke conveyed his displeasure 
because “the brave black soldiers of the Union” were “disarmed and 
robbed by this wicked and despotic order” when “these brave defenders 
of the nation paid for the arms with which they went to battle.”
 
235
More than twenty-five thousand colored men of Kentucky have been 
soldiers in the Army of the Union . . . in many instances are scourged, 
beaten, shot at, and driven from their homes and families.  Their arms 
are taken from them by the civil authorities and confiscated for the 
benefit of the Commonwealth.  The Union soldier is fined for bearing 
  On 
May 23, 1866, it was reported to Congress: 
 
 231. For history discussing the contribution of blacks fighting in the American Revolution, see 
GARY NASH, THE FORGOTTEN FIFTH: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION (2006); 
BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1961); PATRICK J. CHARLES, 
WASHINGTON’S DECISION: THE STORY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON’S DECISION TO REACCEPT 
BLACK ENLISTMENTS IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, DECEMBER 31, 1775 (2006); GLEN KNOBLOCK, 
“STRONG AND BRAVE FELLOWS”: NEW HAMPSHIRE’S BLACK SOLDIERS AND SAILORS IN THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-84 (2003). 
 232. PHILIP S. FONER, BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3 (1975). 
 233. GEORGE MOORE, HISTORICAL NOTES ON EMPLOYMENT OF NEGROES IN THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1862) (New York, Charles T. Evans 1862). 
 234. FONER, supra note 232, at 4. 
 235. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 1839 (1866). 
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arms.  Thus the right of the people to keep and bear arms as provided 
in the Constitution is infringed.236
The Committee of Reconstruction similarly reported, “[P]ersons of 
color constitute no part of the militia of the State, and no one of them 
shall, without permission in writing from the district judge or magistrate, 
be allowed to keep a fire-arm . . . pistol, musket or other fire-arms or 
weapon appropriate for purposes of war.”
 
237
Disarming grievances such as these had nothing to do with armed, 
individual self-defense, and everything to do with military service, a 
national militia, and equality.
 
238  Could the disarming of these veterans, 
i.e., the reserve national militia, been the impetus for applying the “right 
to keep and bear arms” to the States?  It is plausible, but much is left 
unanswered.  Again, many Freedmen had valiantly served to restore the 
United States, yet, were being deprived the very liberty that they fought 
to obtain.239  What was extremely troubling was that they were being 
denied two of the most important political badges of citizenship; the 
right to vote and the right to “keep and bear arms.”240
 
 236. Id. at 2774. 
  As was portrayed 
 237. Ex. Doc. No. 118, 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 7 (1866).  See also LOWELL DAILY 
CITIZEN & NEWS (Lowell, MA), Sept. 13, 1866, pg. 2, col. 1 (“We understand that soldiers who 
have served in the Union armies, and when mustered out pain the United States for their guns, have 
been deprived of these by ex-rebel soldiers, who do not constitute our police.”). 
 238. This is not to say that there were not more general disarming grievances that support the 
broader individual right view.  See Cramer et al., supra note 219, at 855-61. 
 239. See N.Y. TRIB., May 21, 1866, at 1, col. 6 (“But what would most disturb all our hopes 
would be to see those freedmen who had spilled their blood for the defense of the Union rewarded 
for their devotion by being deprived of those rights which are, in all republican governments, the 
appanage of those brave men who are called to bear arms for their country . . . To give those guilty 
of high treason the power to reduce good citizens to the position of political pariahs is to reward 
treachery and to discourage patriotism.”); DAILY AUSTIN REPUBLICAN (Austin, TX), Sept. 14, 1868, 
at 2, col. 2 (“We tax property as the blacks have—we put a poll tax on every mother’s son of 
them—they pay import duties on all they purchase . . . and in the event of invasion or insurrection, 
they will be called on to bear arms.  Whatever difference of opinion whites may entertain as to their 
privileges, there is a surprising unanimity as to their obligations.”).  Many in the New York 
legislature thought it was justifiable to let the Freedmen to bear arms in defense of the Union, yet 
deny them the right to vote; BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 27, 1866, at 1, col. 4 (“Because 
blacks have fought for the country, it is not necessary to give them the right to govern it or 
participate in its government.  IF it were otherwise every brave boy from 16 to 21 who fought in the 
Union ranks should have a vote without waiting for years to participate in the government . . . The 
blacks fought for a country, and they have it; they fought for freedom, and they have it . . . [but] the 
able-bodied only bear arms, and the able-minded only should vote.”). 
 240. These two rights were seen as interrelated.  See 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 1183 
(1866) (“The ‘right to bear arms’ is not plainer taught or more efficient than the right to carry 
ballots.”); LA TRIB. DE LA NEW ORLEANS, Nov. 7, 1865, at 3, col. 2 (“We are forced to pay taxes 
without representation—to submit without appeal to laws, however offensive, without a single voice 
in framing them—to bear arms without the right to say whether against friend or foe, against loyalty 
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in the popular print culture of the era, it was philosophically perplexing 
that it was politically acceptable for blacks to serve and die in defense of 
the Union,241 be counted for apportionment, but at the same time be 
denied service in state militias.242
Disfavor with the disarming of Freedmen veterans—who 
constituted the Union’s national militia—can even be found in the 
popular print culture.  For instance, in an editorial published in the 
Liberator, the Second Amendment was stated verbatim with the 
following to support it: 
  Not to mention, it was upsetting that 
Freedmen were deprived of the very military “arms” that they had been 
given the privilege to purchase from Congress. 
 
or disloyalty.”); N.Y. TRIB.., Mar. 3, 1866, at 9, col. 3 (“[A] democracy of laws which compels the 
able bodied to bear arms and pay taxes, but prohibits the able-minded from having either a vote or 
voice in the policies which control them, is a monstrosity in legislation, a falsehood of politics, and 
a sandy foundation for a Republic.”); LA TRIB. DE LA NEW ORLEANS, Dec. 21, 1866, at 4, cols. 1-2 
(“No one will think of imposing military duties on women and children, compel them to shoulder 
the musket, and send them into the line to fight the battles of the country . . . There is a fixed 
relation between rights and duties . . . Ability to serve and defend the country, in the fields of labor 
and war is, therefore, the basis of electoral immunity.”); N.Y. TRIB., Feb. 24, 1866, at 6, col. 2 (“If 
our brave boys of 16 to 21 years had been expected to volunteer and fight for their country—
perhaps die for it—but that they would in no case and never be allowed a voice in its government . . 
. If this isn’t base and ungrateful, what would be?”); THE LIBERATOR (Boston, MA), Oct. 6, 1865, at 
158, col. 2 (“The moment the Government decided that his aid was necessary to save the 
Government, and put arms into his hands, the question was settled, because to bear arms is the 
highest position of honor, and if he was good enough to fight in the ranks side by side with our 
brave boys in blue, he is good enough to go to the polls.”). 
 241. Members of Congress were also confused how they could rely on these men to defend the 
nation, yet deny them political rights.  See 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 206 (1866) (Mr. 
Farnsworth stated, “we compel them to bear arms in support and defense of the Government, and 
also to that other important fact, that we tax them for the support of Government . . . [yet] that man 
has no right to a voice in the choice of his rulers, and has no lot or part in the Government.”); Id. at 
792 (Thomas Williams stated, “He counts in the representation.  He pays taxes, and must bear arms 
if necessary, and he has done it.  No sensible man now pretends to doubt that he is a citizen, or can 
doubt it in view of these considerations.”); Id. at 2801 (The Address of the Swiss Conventions read, 
“But what would most disturb all our hopes would be to see those freedmen who had spilled their 
blood for the defense of the Union . . . [to be] deprived of those rights which are, in all republican 
Governments, the appanage of those brave men who are called to bear arms for their country.”).  
See also id. at 145, 1183; 38 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 1995 (1864); 42 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST 
SESSION, at  266 (1871). 
 242. See THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Jan. 10, 1867, at 1, col. 8 (The Ohio States’ Equal 
Rights League proclaimed: “Because we bear arms.  We have watered the tree of liberty copiously 
with our blood.  The battlefields of the American Revolution, those of 1812, and of the late terrible 
rebellion, all furnish abundant proofs of the courage and devotion of the colored American, and his 
valuable services as a patriot and soldier.  If then the State relies on us to defend it with our lives in 
war, we solemnly ask in the name of justice for that protection which is only secured by a full and 
equal enjoyment of is privileges in time of peace.”). 
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When our great war closed, it was deemed advisable that the soldiers 
of the Union should be allowed to retain the arms they had so nobly 
borne, on condition of payment by each of what was considered by the 
Government their cash value.  An order was accordingly issued by the 
War Department proffering to each honorably discharged soldier the 
privilege of purchasing his weapon on payment of that sum.  So said, 
so done, until now, on the representation of the ex-rebels of Louisiana, 
Gen. Canby has nullified Mr. Stanton’s order, directing that the 
colored soldiers mustered out of service in his department shall not be 
allowed to buy their muskets!243
Three weeks later the Liberator published another editorial 
discussing the unequal treatment Freedmen received.  Regarding the 
constitutional right to “bear arms,” it read: 
 
“Persons of color constitute no part of the militia of the State!”  But 
this is an insult to every survivor of Fort Wagner.  No one of them,” 
says the code, “shall be allowed to keep a fire-arm, sword, or other 
military weapon.”  And all this in spite of the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution of the United States, both of which 
assert the citizen’s right to bear arms.244
The Second Amendment was primarily looked to as protecting the 
right of Freedmen to “keep and bear arms” for service in the militia for 
many reasons.  For instance, Judge R.H. Dana, Jr. delivered a speech 
proclaiming, “We have a right to demand that [Freedmen] shall bear 
arms as soldiers in the militia.  Have we not?”
 
245  Citing the Second 
Amendment as authority, Dana’s view was that it was unlawful for states 
to exclude Freedmen from the “right to bear arms” because it is not 
dependant “upon the decision of any State.”246  Instead, he rationalized 
that because “Congress makes the [national] militia” that it was within 
the national interest to “see to it that the emancipated slaves have the 
privilege, the dignity and the power of an arms-bearing population.”247
In an 1866 editorial published in The North American and United 
States Gazette, the author applauded the “bold step to make soldiers of 
such men in a region where they had been so long held to an inferior 
race[.]”
 
248
 
 243. THE LIBERATOR, Nov. 17, 1865, at 183, col. 3. 
  “The real importance” of affording Freedmen the privilege to 
 244. THE LIBERATOR, Dec. 8, 1865, at 193, col. 5. 
 245. LA TRIBUNE DE LA NEW ORLEANS, July 1, 1865, at 3, col. 2. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. THE NORTH AMERICAN AND UNITED STATES GAZETTE (Philadelphia, PA), Oct. 23, 1866, 
at 2, col. 1. 
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serve their country, wrote the author, “is the recognition thus afforded of 
the right of the blacks to bear arms, always disputed previously, 
notwithstanding the guarantee of the national Constitution.”249  
However, these “very men who were deemed fit to be soldiers of the 
Union” were now being “disarmed by rebel State officials all over the 
south”—which was viewed as an express violation of the Second 
Amendment.250
Recurring . . . to the language of the Constitution, we find that [the 
Second Amendment] couples this great right with the necessity for a 
militia, showing obviously enough that the people to be allowed to 
keep and bear arms are those of whom a militia can be composed.  Of 
course, we shall here be answered that the militia is a State institution, 
regulated by State laws, and as no blacks are included in it by the laws 
of the southern States, none of them are deprived by this article of the 
Constitution.  Why, then, does the Constitution deem it necessary to 
throw this safeguard around it?  If the militia be wholly a State 
institution, why should the national Constitution look after it thus?  
Moreover if the militia belong wholly to the State, where is the 
republic to look for soldiers when the State orders the militia to rebel? . 
. . [Freedmen] are peculiarly the “people” of the nation, and under the 
words of the Constitution are entitled to bear arms.  This is clear from 
the fact that they have so borne arms as soldiers of the republic . . . 
Thus . . . we see but one conclusion—that the negroes of the south 
have the constitutional right to keep and bear arms.  If they have not, 
then they cannot constitutionally be counted at all in apportioning 
representatives to the south.
  The editorial elaborated on this point, stating: 
251
Other newspaper reports reveal that Freedmen were fighting for a 
militia right to “keep and bear arms” alongside whites.  For instance, the 
Chicago Tribune reported its disfavor of South Carolina’s Black Codes, 
including the law proclaiming “No person of color shall bear arms or 
serve in the militia.”
 
252  Similar disfavor was conveyed by the South 
Carolina Colored Convention when it proclaimed that such laws are 
“forbidden, as a plain violation of the Constitution, and unjust to many 
of us in the highest degree, who have been soldiers, and purchased our 
muskets from the United States Government when mustered out of the 
service.”253
 
 249. Id. 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. THE SUN (Baltimore, MD), June 2, 1869, at 3, col. 5. 
 253. THE LIBERATOR, Dec. 8, 1765, at 195, col. 4. 
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Meanwhile, other Freedmen organizations expressed their 
appreciation in being granted their Second Amendment right to 
participate in state militias.  For instance, after the adoption of the 1866 
Civil Rights Act,254 the Tennessee Freedmen’s Convention thanked the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress for ensuring that the “inherent privilege as free 
citizens to bear arms” was protected.255  The Convention promised to 
exercise their right by enrolling “in the militia of the State ready for the 
defense of Tennessee with the same privileges allotted to white 
inhabitants.”256  Naturally, not every state complied with changing their 
militia laws to include Freedmen.  For this reason the Baltimore 
Republican State Convention displayed its disfavor by stating if the 
people of Maryland “expect us to bear arms” for the Union, “there is no 
reason why we should not be allowed in time of peace to organize 
volunteer companies to acquaint ourselves with military service.”257
To sum up the legal dilemma at hand, there is substantiating 
historical evidence to suggest that a majority of the Reconstruction 
Congress viewed the Privileges or Immunities Clause as applying a 
“well-regulated militia” right to the States.  As Judge Dana rationalized 
it, given that “Congress makes the militia,” people of all classes, 
including “the emancipated slaves[,] have the privilege, the dignity and 
the power” to bear arms in federal and state militias.
 
258
 
 254. It is often asserted that the 1866 Freedman’s Bureau Act proves that the Reconstruction 
Congress wanted to secure a right to possess arms in the home.  See Randy E. Barnett, Was the 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
237, 269 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE 
RIGHT TO ARMS, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)).  However, there is evidence 
suggesting that the drafters may have been primarily concerned with protecting a militia or auxiliary 
right.  The pertinent Freedman’s Bureau Act section states that citizens shall “have full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the 
acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right 
to bear arms.”  14 U.S. STAT. 176-77 (1866).  Notice how the text “constitutional right to bear arms” 
is separated from the text “personal security.”  Id.  This is significant because Mr. Raymond also 
separated the Second Amendment from self-defense when he stated before Congress: “He has a 
defined status; he has a country and a home; a right to defend himself and his wife and children; a 
right to bear arms; a right to testify in the federal courts; he has all those rights that tend to elevate 
him.”  39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 1266 (1866).  This separation of text implies that the 
drafters were protecting the limited militia or auxiliary right.  In many ways, one may read the act as 
akin to William Blackstone’s fifth auxiliary right.  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 138-39 (1765); Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance, 
supra note 15, at 24-60. 
  Opponents of 
this approach will argue that this evidence does not override the fact that 
 255. NEW YORK TRIBUNE, Aug. 11, 1866, at 1, col. 3. 
 256. Id. 
 257. THE LIBERATOR, Nov. 17, 1865, at 183, col. 3. 
 258. Id. 
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Fourteenth Amendment ratifiers viewed the Second Amendment as 
protecting the right to “keep and bear arms” against private violence as 
well.  It will be argued that the historical record is full of evidence 
suggesting that the ratifiers sought to protect this personal individual 
right, as well as the militia right. 
This article respectfully disagrees that the Individual Right Scholar 
approach reflects the unequivocal view of the entire Congress or the 
people as a whole.  Certainly, there were members who sought to 
incorporate an armed self-defense right.  However, there is historical 
evidence suggesting many did not intend to override state sovereignty on 
the “keeping” of arms outside of a “well-regulated militia.”  While this 
article does not seek to provide an exhaustive look into this historical 
debate, it does seek to illuminate that there is overwhelming evidence to 
suggest that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have only 
agreed to incorporate the Bill of Rights as the founding fathers 
understood it259 in the spirit of 1776, when the Declaration of 
Independence was adopted.260
 
 259. N.Y. TRIBUNE, Feb. 3, 1866, at 12, col. 1 (statement of Sen. Stevens) (“The time has come 
when we can make the Constitution what our fathers desired to make it.  The time has come when 
through blood every stain has been washed out unless we choose to reestablish it.”); 40 CONG. 
GLOBE, THIRD SESSION 1004 (1869) (statement Sen. Yates) (“[T]he surest way by which we shall 
accomplish our purpose [of restoring the Union] will be to assert that which the Constitution of the 
United States meant to assert.  It meant to assert the principles in the Declaration of Independence.  
The Constitution of the United States was made and framed by the men who framed and made the 
Declaration of Independence; and if they did not in the Constitution of the United States carry out 
the principles contained in the Declaration of Independence.”); 42 CONG. GLOBE, SECOND SESSION 
844 (1872) (statement Sen. Sherman) (“There may be sometimes dispute and doubt as to what is the 
right, immunity, or privilege conferred upon a citizen of the United States . . . look first at the 
Constitution of the United States as the primary foundation of authority.  If that does not define the 
right they will look for the unenumerated powers to the Declaration of Independence, to every scrap 
of American Independence, to every scrap of American history, to the history of England, to the 
common law of England . . . There they will find the fountain and reservoir of the right of American 
as well as English citizens.”). 
  In other words, the ratifiers sought to 
 260. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2510 (1866) (statement of Rep. Miller) (“[T]hat no State 
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny equal 
protection of the laws, [is] so clearly within the spirit of the Declaration of Independence . . . that no 
member of this House can seriously object to it.”); id. at 2539 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth) (“I 
want some principle embodied in a constitutional amendment that the southern States will accept.  I 
intend to vote for this amendment . . . for I am not without hope that Congress and the people of the 
several States may yet rise above a mean prejudice and do equal and exact justice to all men, put 
putting in practice that ‘self-evident truth’ of the Declaration of Independence, that Governments 
‘derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,’ . . . So far as [Section 1] is concerned 
there is but one clause in it which is not already in the Constitution,’ the Equal Protection Clause); 
40 CONG. GLOBE, SECOND SESSION 1967 (1868) (statement of Rep. Stevens) (affirming the purpose 
of the Reconstruction Congress is to restore the Constitution to “the principles of government which 
were intended by the fathers when in 1776 they laid the foundations of the Government on which 
the nation was built.”). 
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maintain the States’ traditional sovereign powers concerning the 
possession, use, and ownership of arms for private purposes. 
Moving forward under this approach, the individual use of arms, 
for purposes outside of a militia, would have been protected under the 
Equal Protection Clause—an interpretation that is supported by the 
speeches of John Bingham.261  For instance, in a 1867 speech delivered 
to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham stated the Fourteenth 
Amendment “would remain intact the powers of the national and State 
governments—the one for general defense and protection, the other for 
local administration and personal security[.]”262  A similar speech was 
delivered when Bingham was facing heavy opposition to the inclusion of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  He calmed states’ rights and “state 
sovereignty” advocates by stating that all rights and privileges as the 
“result of positive local law,” such as the right to vote, would not be 
affected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.263  Bingham viewed 
local rights and privileges as being protected by the Equal Protection 
Clause, for it “established equality before the law, and it gives to the 
humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights, and 
the same protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the 
most wealthy, or the most haughty.”264
Bingham
Arguably, the right or privilege to 
possess, use, and operate firearms outside of a militia circa 1866 would 
fall within a “positive local law” to which Bingham referred. 
265 was not the only person to assuage states’ sovereignty 
advocates in this fashion.  James Garfield not only repeated Bingham’s 
words verbatim, but stated, “[T]his amendment takes from no State any 
right that ever pertained to it.”266
 
 261. For an analysis that many members of Congress and legal commentators shared 
Bingham’s views on the applicability of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, see Aynes, On 
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 230, at 74-94. 
  Meanwhile, William Lawrence stated, 
“it must be clear that this bill creates no new right, confers no new 
privilege, but is declaratory of what is already the constitutional rights of 
every citizen in every State, that equality of civil rights is the 
 262. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, September 2, 1867, at 1, col. 5.  See also THE 
CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 26, 1869, at 1, col. 4 (speech of John Bingham) (“Was it 
because the [Fourteenth] amendment took from any State any right reserved to the several States 
under the Constitution?  If so, what right?”). 
 263. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2766 (1866). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Writing after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham stated, “God forbid” 
that the Fourteenth Amendment “would strike down the rights of the State” because he “believ[ed] 
our dual system of government essential to our national existence.”  42 CONG. GLOBE, SPECIAL 
SESSION 84 (1871). 
 266. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2542 (1866). 
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fundamental rule that pervades the Constitution and controls all State 
authority.”267
In an 1871 report drafted for the Committee of the Judiciary, John 
Bingham would reiterate his stance that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause does not impede on what were always considered to be 
traditional matters of state sovereignty.  The report stated that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “did not change or modify the relations of 
citizens of the State and notation as they existed under the original 
Constitution.”
 
268  It is a point of emphasis that Bingham was seeking to 
restore the founders’ Constitution.  This is confirmed in his speeches.  
On August 24, 1869, Bingham stated the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was to restore the 
“original and declared purpose of the Constitution,” and “lost justice 
shall be established in the land[.]”269
These gentlemen say they are for the Constitution, the great 
Constitution which our fathers gave us.  Let them read in the forefront 
of that instrument, those words that should be written this day upon the 
lintels of ever door in the land: “We the people of the United States, in 
order to establish justice, do ordain this Constitution,” etc.  I am for the 
Constitution, too; and equal political rights amongst all natural born 
citizens, in every station of life, is simple justice.  Therefore I am for it, 
and in standing for it I but imitate the great majority of the people, 
who, in 1787, formed the Constitution of the Government, and handed 
it down to us as a nation.
  Similarly, in a speech defending 
the Fourteenth Amendment against political opponents, Bingham stated: 
270
To be precise, not even the Fourteenth Amendment’s chief architect 
viewed Section 1 as impacting federalism any more than the founding 
fathers intended.  Senator Morrill agreed with this interpretation, stating 
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not change “an iota of the 
Constitution, as it was originally framed.”
 
271
 
 267. 42 CONG. GLOBE, SPECIAL SESSION 151 (1871). 
 
 267. This fear was repetitively asserted during the 1866 Civil Rights Bill.  See 39 CONG. 
GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 478, 1121, 1270 (1866).  See also 42 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 189 
(1871) (statement of Rep. Willard) (the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes “the great and solemn 
guarantees of liberty and equal rights, the truths of the grand Declaration of Independence made 
facts in our history, and made sure by our fundamental law.  But we should never forget that, with 
the exception of such limitations as have been created by the new amendments, the States exist with 
the same exclusive powers, the same sovereignty within their spheres, as before.”). 
 268. H.R. Rep. No. 41-22, at, 1 (1871). 
 269. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 26, 1869, at 1, col. 3. 
 270. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 26, 1867, at 1, col. 5. 
 271. 42 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 577 (1871). 
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Others viewed Section 1 similarly by stressing the significance of 
the Equal Protection Clause.  As John Farnsworth eloquently stated: 
So far as this section [1 of the Fourteenth Amendment] is concerned, 
there is but one clause in it which is not already in the Constitution, 
and it might as well in my opinion read, “No State shall deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”272
Given that many members of Congress did not seek to alter the 
traditional spheres of government, this strengthens the claim that the 
Equal Protection Clause that was meant to apply to the individual 
possession, use, and operation of arms—what many members in the 
Reconstruction Congress would have viewed as Article IV Section 2 
privileges.  In the words of John Bingham, privileges that fell under 
“article 4, section 2” were to be enforced equally “as an express 
limitation upon the powers of the States.”
 
273
Naturally, there were varying interpretations as to what the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause encompassed.
 
274  Senator Poland saw it 
as “securing nothing beyond what was intended” by Article IV Section 
2, ensuring the states equally protected the “doctrine of State rights,” and 
that Congress had the power to “enforce this provision throughout the 
country and compel its observance.”275  Meanwhile, Senator Morrill saw 
the two clauses as “equivalent at best,” with the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s as a means to enforce the Article IV Section 2 clause.276  
However, if the two clauses were distinct as they imply, Morrill thought 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges and immunities” as “not the 
full extent of citizenship, or the rights and privileges of citizenship in a 
particular State, by any means[.]”277
In the end, the threshold interpretational question boils down to 
this: “Did the ratifiers, as a whole or majority, view personal arms 
ownership, use, and operation as purely an issue of State sovereignty or 
 
 
 272. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2539 (1866). 
 273. H.R. Rep. No. 41-22, at 1 (1871). 
 274. See 41 CONG. GLOBE, THIRD SESSION 4 (1871); 42 CONG. GLOBE, SPECIAL SESSION 87 
(1871) (Congressman Storm interpreted it as follows: “The privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States had already been secured by article four, section two, clause one of the 
Constitution, which provides that ‘the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several States.’”); 42 CONG. GLOBE, SECOND SESSION 763 (1872) (Mr. 
Davis stated: “The fourteenth amendment guarantees to every citizen of the United States who may 
change his residence from one State to another all the privileges and immunities which a citizen of 
the State, to which he removes may enjoy . . . The prohibition is in very plain language.”). 
 275. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2961 (1866). 
 276. 42 CONG. GLOBE, SECOND SESSION 3 (1872). 
 277. Id. at 4. 
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was this too intended to be protected as a privilege of United States 
citizenship?”  This article does not seek to provide a definitive answer.  
However, if one takes Bingham’s 1871 speech verbatim, the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause was only intended to apply the Second 
Amendment to the States as a means to protect “the right to bear arms 
for the Union and the Constitution”278—nothing more, nothing less.  All 
other privileges or rights to arms for private purposes would have fell in 
the category of “positive local law,”279and would not be affected by the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause because it “did not change or modify 
the relations of citizens of the State and notation as they existed under 
the original Constitution.”280
Bingham’s words still leave us with one more question: “How did 
the ratifiers understand the Second Amendment as binding the States 
under the original Constitution?”  One way to answer this question is to 
look to the constitutional writings of Timothy Farrar, whom interpreted 
the Constitution with this question in mind.  The work of Farrar is 
particularly appropriate because his understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has been frequently used to support the argument that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause applies the Bill of Rights to the 
States.
 
281  More importantly, for the McDonald decision, it was one of 
the two treatises cited by the plurality as expounding the “fundamental 
nature” of possessing a handgun for personal self-defense.282
A former law partner of Daniel Webster, judge of the New 
Hampshire Court of Common Pleas, and president of the New England 
Historical and Genealogical Society, Farrar was a well-respected legal 
figure in the nineteenth century.
 
283  The author of Manual of the 
Constitution of the United States of America,284 Farrar’s treatise was 
described by Charles Sumner as correcting “false interpretations” of the 
Constitution and should be “generally accepted now.”285
 
 278. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Sept. 15, 1871, at 2, col. 4. 
  The 
 279. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2766 (1866). 
 280. H.R. Rep. No. 41-22, at 1, (1871). 
 281. See Aynes, Ink Blot or Not, supra note 233, at 1321-22; Curtis, supra note 224, at 1172 
n.345; Kopel, supra note 96, at 1470-72; Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment 
Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process 
Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV. 1, 31 (2007). 
 282. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010). 
 283. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 230, at 
84-85. 
 284. TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(1867) (1st ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co.1867). 
 285. 9 THE NEW ENGLAND HISTORICAL GENEALOGICAL REGISTER 231 (Henry Fitz-Gilbert 
Waters ed., 1875). 
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Philadelphia Inquirer reported that Farrar’s treatise was “exceedingly 
useful . . . at the present time; one that no student of the Constitution, no 
lawyer and, above all no legislator should be without.”286  The Daily 
Evening Bulletin described it as “ably written,” “pervaded by a spirit of 
candor,” and that there “was never a time when there was more need of 
an intelligent study of the great charter of our Republic.”287  The 
Cincinnati Daily Gazette thought it “especially timely,” “a crushing 
refutation of State right theories,” and a “well nigh exhaustive treatise on 
Constitutional Law.”288
Farrar’s Manual of the Constitution of the United States of America 
is of particular significance in our constitutional jurisprudence because it 
was one of the first treatises to analyze the Fourteenth Amendment 
contemporaneous with its adoption.  It was a work made to be 
“accessible and useful to the multitudes[.]”
 
289  As The American 
Presbyterian Review reported, Farrar was “Widely known as a sound 
lawyer” and his treatise was intended for “popular use, and not almost 
addressed exclusively to the members of” the legal profession.290
Concerning the application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause to the States, the pertinent sections of 
Farrar’s manual read as follows: 
 
In respect to the powers of the government, it is of the same general 
character as the last.  It re-affirms some pre-existing power, but adds 
no new ones . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of the United States . . . This will 
scarcely be claimed by anybody to delegate any thing new to the 
government, or to prohibit the States from doing any thing which 
otherwise they might rightfully do . . . Thus, it will appear, by a minute 
analysis of the fourteenth Amendment, that it contains no 
augmentation of the powers of the [State or federal] government.291
 
 286. THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 9, 1867, at 2, col. 2. 
 
 287. DAILY EVENING BULLETIN, Oct. 19, 1867, at 1, col. 3. 
 288. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Oct. 23, 1867, at 1, col. 3.See also NEW HAMPSHIRE 
SENTINEL, Apr. 3, 1873, at 1, col. 2 (describing Farrar’s treatise as a “valuable work”).  For the most 
detailed review, see 26 NEW ENGLANDER 725-40 (New Haven, CT, October 1867).  Of course, not 
all reviews of Farrar’s treatise were positive.  See 9 AMERICAN LITERARY GAZETTE AND 
PUBLISHERS’ CIRCULAR 268 (Philadelphia, PA, Sept. 16, 1867) (describing Farrar’s treatise as “the 
anti-state-right doctrine”); 87 CHRISTIAN EXAMINER 99-104 (New York, NY, July 1869) 
(recommending John Pomeroy’s An Introduction to Constitutional Law in the United States over 
Farrar’s treatise). 
 289.  2 THE AMERICAN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW 459, 467 (Philadelphia, PA, July 1870). 
 290. Id. 
 291. FARRAR, supra note 284, at 401-02, 408. 
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Regarding the application of the Second Amendment to the States, 
in light of the Fourteenth Amendment, Farrar’s treatise does not give a 
detailed analysis.  In multiple instances he lays the claim that the Second 
Amendment is a right of the people, which binds the States as well as the 
federal government.292  However, Farrar gives no indication that the 
Second Amendment binds the States as to prevent state and municipal 
governments from regulating the possession, use, and operation of arms 
for private purposes.293  It can be assumed that Farrar did not see the 
Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting “the States from doing any thing 
which otherwise they might rightfully do,”294
Perhaps the answer lies with the fact that Farrar’s interpretation of 
the Constitution was in line with John Bingham.  Like Bingham, Farrar 
had always viewed the Bill of Rights as applying to the States.
 such as regulating the 
private possession, use, and operation of arms, but the Manual of the 
Constitution of the United States of America leaves much unanswered. 
295
The first ten amendments are in the nature of a “Bill of Rights,” and it 
is a matter of history that they were proposed by some of the State 
Conventions, recommended by the first Congress, and adopted by the 
Nation . . . They enunciate certain abstract principles, and recognize 
certain personal rights, as inherent in every man under the protection 
of the Government.  The first only is an express negation of power in 
Congress.  The other no more deny the power of Congress than of 
everybody else.  They deny the power of everybody, only by 
implication, because the existence of the power would be inconsistent 
with the security of the recognized right.  They prescribe no duty.  
This, also is left to implication.  Is the duty wholly upon the General 
Government of the United States? And is it well performed when they 
abstain from violating the right themselves, though they allow it to be 
violated by every municipal corporation in the land?  The people of the 
United States claim these rights, and inserted their recognition of them 
  In an 
1862 article entitled States Rights, Farrar disagreed with the holding in 
Barron v. Baltimore, writing: 
 
 292. Id. at 59, 145, 295, 396, 513. 
 293. Farrar’s second and third editions did not add or take away from his analysis of the 
Second Amendment.  See TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 59, 145, 286, 396, 513, 561 (2d ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1869); 
TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 59, 145, 
286, 396, 513, 563 (3d ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1872). 
 294. FARRAR, supra note 284, at 402. 
 295. See Timothy Farrar, State Rights, 21 NEW ENGLANDER 695 (Oct. 1862).  Naturally, Farrar 
was not the first constitutional commentator to apply the Bill of Rights to the States.  See RAWLE, 
supra note 134, at 114-37. 
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in their fundamental law, for the purpose of holding their own 
Government responsible for the protection and enjoyment of them.296
It is here that Farrar provides his most detailed analysis of the 
Second Amendment, and its application to the States.  What stood out to 
Farrar in particular was the Second Amendment’s use of “shall not be 
infringed.”  He queried, “May it still be infringed by everybody except 
Congress, and Congress not bound to protect it?”
 
297
Purely taking into account Farrar’s Manual of the Constitution of 
the United States of America, one could argue either way.  One argument 
would claim that Farrar makes no mention of a “well-regulated militia,” 
and describes the “right to keep and bear arms” as an individual right.
  But what Second 
Amendment right was Farrar referring to?  Was it a right to personal 
self-defense or was it a right to participate in a “well-regulated militia” 
in defense of the Union? 
298  
Thus, the only logical conclusion is that Farrar believed the Second 
Amendment was applicable to the States as ensuring individuals have a 
right to “keep and bear arms” against private violence.  The counter-
argument to this would read that Farrar lists “the right to keep and bear 
arms” as being protected under the “general powers of the government 
to provide for the common defence,”299
The tipping point may rest with Farrar’s 1862 article entitled State 
Rights, for he observed the Second Amendment as being applicable “to 
the states by [its] terms.”
 thus Farrar clearly understood 
the Second Amendment as applicable to the States in a purely “well-
regulated militia” context. 
300  To be precise, Farrar viewed the Second 
Amendment’s use of “free State” as the implication that bound the “right 
to keep and bear arms” to the States.  He wrote “If a well regulated 
militia is necessary to a free state, it is certainly as necessary that the 
right to bear arms should not be infringed by the state itself, as by any 
body else.”301  From this statement it can be ascertained that Farrar 
viewed the Second Amendment in its “well-regulated militia” context 
rather than just as a “right to keep and bear arms” for any and all 
purposes as others have asserted.302
 
 296. Farrar, supra note 293, at 711. 
 
 297. Id. at 712. 
 298. FARRAR, supra note 284, at 59, 145, 295, 396, 513. 
 299. Id. at 286. 
 300. Farrar, State Rights, supra note 293, at 712. 
 301. Id. 
 302. See Kopel, supra note 96, at 1471  (“Farrar believed that the Bill of Rights, including the 
enumerated right of a person to keep and bear arms, was enforceable against the states even without 
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Again, this article does not seek to answer the historical question as 
to whether the Reconstruction Congress agreed with John Bingham’s 
1871 speech and Timothy Farrar as to the application of the Second 
Amendment to the States.  Many historical questions regarding “public 
understanding” remain unanswered.  However, what this article does set 
forth to illuminate is Justice Stevens’ point that accepted historical 
methodologies can only take us so far in understanding what the 
Fourteenth Amendment ratifiers, as a whole, intended.  Whether this 
historical analysis would have shifted the outcome of McDonald is 
unclear.  However, if one views the primary legal issue in McDonald as 
the right to “keep arms,” this historical evidence may have caused the 
Justices to rethink their judicial approach.  Naturally, the legal 
community can only speculate. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
There are two important historical aspects that legal commentators, 
scholars, and historians can take from McDonald v. City of Chicago.  
The first is that the “historical guidepost” standard of review is the 
proper means to determine the constitutionality of gun regulations.  A 
“historical guidepost” is either a longstanding historical restriction on 
the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms circa 1791 or a longstanding 
ideology for regulating or restricting the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms 
circa 1791.  The “historical guidepost” standard of review requires 
courts to give federal and State governments deference to adopt gun 
restrictions that fall within traditional and historical areas of regulation 
as would have been publicly accepted by the founding fathers.  This 
includes restrictions designed to protect the public against injury, and 
regulations on aliens, hunting, felons and the mentally ill, the carrying of 
arms in public, concealed weapons, limiting the types of arms 
individuals may possess, the transportation of arms, and the discharging 
of arms in public. 
With the exception of regulations designed to prevent “public 
injury,” regulations that fall within these traditional restraints should be 
viewed under a rationale basis standard of review.  To put it another 
way, traditional regulations circa 1791 should be analyzed under the 
lowest standard of scrutiny unless the challenging party can show that 
the founding fathers would have thought such regulations were not 
 
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the right to arms was treated as one of the important individual 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”). 
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constitutionally permissible.  It is when the challenging party succeeds 
that the courts should move to step two. 
It must be emphasized that the “historical guidepost” standard of 
review does not require directly linking the law in question to a 1791 
restriction in order to qualify as “publicly accepted.”  The question that 
the courts have to ask is whether the founder’s understanding of the right 
to arms would have accepted it, for the historical method does not have 
to be the “perfect means . . . but whether it is the best means available in 
an imperfect world.”303  In other words, the historical issue is whether 
under “any historical methodology, under any plausible standard of 
proof, would lead to the same conclusion.”304
The second important historical aspect that commentators, scholars, 
and historians can take from McDonald is that the history of the “right to 
keep and bear arms” was not as comprehensively litigated as many 
thought.  The State Second Amendment analogues circa 1789,
 
305 
1803,306 1820,307 and 1868308
In 1874, The Central Law Journal published a series of articles set 
out to answer this question in the constraints of judicial review.  Entitled 
The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence,
 all reveal the right to “keep arms” was not 
as prominent in the States as the Heller majority and McDonald plurality 
has led the legal community to believe.  Furthermore, assuming the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause applied the Bill of Rights to the States, 
the historical record is unclear as to which interpretation of the Second 
Amendment its ratifiers as a whole were seeking to apply.  Was it an 
amendment intended to protect the right to bear arms for “public 
defence,” “private defence,” or both? 
309
 
 303. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (emphasis in original). 
  
the articles comprise the first law review article on the Second 
Amendment.  Written anonymously, it sought to answer whether the 
Second Amendment bound the States as well as the federal government.  
In particular, the article examined the varying court opinions as to what 
rights the Second Amendment and corresponding State analogues 
afforded.  The conclusion that The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for 
 304. Id. at 3058. 
 305. See supra Part III.A. 
 306. See supra Part III.A.; see supra Chart I. 
 307. See supra note 190. 
 308. See supra Part III.A.; see supra Chart II. 
 309. See The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence, 1CENT. L. J. 259 
(May 28, 1874); The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence, 1 CENT. L. J. 
273 (June 4, 1874); The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence, 1 CENT. L. J. 
295 (June 18, 1874). 
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Private and Public Defence reached was the opposite of the McDonald 
plurality: 
[T]here would seem to remain no doubt that if the question [of the 
Second Amendment applying to the States] should ever arise in [the 
Supreme Court] it would be held that the second amendment of the 
federal constitution is restrictive upon the general government merely, 
and not upon the states, and that every state has the power to regulate 
the bearing of arms in such manner as it sees fit, or to restrain it 
altogether.310
In coming to this determination, the authors were following 
Supreme Court precedent circa 1874, holding that the Bill of Rights did 
not apply to the States.
 
311  However, what is significant is that the 
authors disagreed with this precedent in the constraints of the Second 
Amendment.  Much like the way Timothy Farrar viewed the use of “free 
State” as the implication that bound the Second Amendment to the 
States in its “well-regulated militia” context,312
So in the Arkansas case, The State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18,
 the anonymous authors 
of The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence 
took a similar stance: 
313 all the 
judges appear to have understood this amendment as applicable to the 
states; and Judge Dickinson supposes it to pertain to the power 
possessed by the general government of organizing, arming, and 
disciplining the militia.  He says this provision of the federal 
constitution “is but an assertion of that general right of sovereignty 
belonging to independent nations, to regulate their military force.”  
This view of Judge Dickinson contains the only plausible reason we 
have met with for supposing that this amendment is binding on the 
states.314
This begets the question: “Why is this first law review on the 
Second Amendment significant?”  The answer is that what constitutes 
“public understanding” of the Second Amendment circa 1868 is not as 
 
 
 310. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 309, at 296. 
 311. Id. at 295 (citing Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 
410 (1847); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1855); Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 74 U.S. 321 
(1869)). 
 312. Farrar, supra note 293, at 711. 
 313. State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (Ark. 1842).  See also English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 475 (18) 
(“[T]his one seems to be of a nature to bind both the State and National legislatures . . . the right to 
‘bear’ arms refers merely to the military way of using them, not to their use in bravado and 
affray.”). 
 314. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 309, at 295 (emphasis added). 
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clear and convincing as the Heller majority and McDonald plurality 
would have it.  The fact that some members of Congress viewed the 
Second Amendment as securing a right against private violence does not 
dictate how Congress or “public understanding” as a whole understood 
it.  The Amendment’s mention of a “well-regulated militia” and a “free 
State” was often construed as protecting purely a militia right as the 
1874 anonymous law review makes clear. 
Of course, the matter of Second Amendment incorporation has 
been settled in McDonald, thus leaving what truly constituted 1868 
“public understanding” of the Second Amendment moot to much of the 
legal community.  This fact, however, should not disparage historians 
and legal scholars from definitively finding the consensus of the “right 
to keep and bear arms” among the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers.  
While historians like Michael Kent Curtis and Robert J. Cottrol, legal 
scholars such as Richard L. Aynes and Bryan Wildenthal, and Individual 
Right Scholars such as Don B. Kates and Stephen P. Halbrook have 
provided much to this debate, there are still many questions left 
unanswered to fully appreciate what was the “public understanding” of 
the right circa 1868. 
